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I. THE HIPPODROME OF THE GODS:   
RACING AGAINST ECOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY APOCALYPSE 
Humanity, quite literally, is deep-sixing its planetary home. During the Phanero-
zoic eon, a span of 542 million years from the initial emergence of hard-shelled ani-
mals to the present,1 the earth has experienced at least five catastrophic losses of 
biodiversity: the Ordovician-Silurian, the late Devonian, the Permian-Triassic, the 
Triassic-Jurassic, and the Cretaceous-Paleogene extinction events.2 Humanity has 
pushed “the biological world” toward its “sixth major extinction event.”3 Severe 
enough to constitute “biological annihilation” on a global scale,4 this death spasm  
 
                                                                                                             
 
 1. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Miller, Michelle A. Kominz, James V. Browning, James D. 
Wright, Gregory S. Mountain, Miriam E. Katz, Peter J. Sugarman, Benjamin S. Cramer, 
Nicholas Christie-Blick & Stephen F. Pekar, The Phanerozoic Record of Global Sea-
Level Change, 310 SCIENCE 1293, 1293 (2005); cf. Alexander V. Markov & Andrey V. 
Korotayev, Phanerozoic Marine Biodiversity Follows a Hyperbolic Trend, 16 
PALAEOWORLD 311 (2007) (extrapolating a hyperbolic model of marine biodiversity over 
the last 542 million years). The term Phanerozoic is derived from the ancient Greek words 
φανερός and ζωή, which together mean “visible life.” See POCKET OXFORD CLASSICAL 
GREEK DICTIONARY 338, 150 (James Morwood & John Taylor eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
GREEK DICTIONARY]. I derived additional support for translations of ancient and modern 
Greek words and roots used throughout this Article from http://www.kypros.org/cgi-
bin/lexicon [https://perma.cc/V5KV-6YLF] and http://www.etymonline.com [https:// 
perma.cc/SR75-9NKB]. In addition, the authoritative dictionary, HENRY GEORGE 
LIDDELL & ROBERT SCOTT, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON (1940), may be searched online 
at PERSEUS DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper [https://perma 
.cc/GB4L-9DEE]. 
 2. See David M. Raup & J. John Sepkoski, Jr., Mass Extinctions in the Marine Fossil 
Record, 215 SCIENCE 1501, 1502 (1982). For an updated survey of mass extinction events 
throughout geologic history, see David P.G. Bond & Stephen E. Grasby, On the Causes 
of Mass Extinctions, 478 PALAEOGEOGRAPHY, PALAEOCLIMATOLOGY & PALAEOECOLOGY 
3 (2017). Nearly everyone of a certain age knows the Cretaceous-Paleogene extinction 
by a different name, the Cretaceous-Tertiary. The International Commission on 
Stratigraphy has deprecated the term Tertiary and substituted the terms Paleogene and 
Neogene as designations for the periods of the Cenozoic Era. See Robert A. Rohde, 
Whatever Happened to the Tertiary and Quaternary?, GEOWHEN DATABASE,  http:// 
stratigraphy.org/bak/geowhen/TQ.html [https://perma.cc/47E4-FLR2] (last updated Jan. 
18, 2005). But this decision trashes “terminology with nearly 250 years of history” and 
contradicts popular references to “the extinction of the dinosaurs at the Cretaceous-
Tertiary (or K-T) boundary.” Id. 
 3. J. A. Thomas, M. G. Telfer, D. B. Roy, C. D. Preston, J. J. D. Greenwood, J. 
Asher, R. Fox, R. T. Clarke & J. H. Lawton, Comparative Losses of British Butterflies, 
Birds, and Plants and the Global Extinction Crisis, 303 SCIENCE 1879, 1881 (2004); see 
also, e.g., ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY (2014); 
RICHARD LEAKEY & ROGER LEWIN, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: PATTERNS OF LIFE AND THE 
FUTURE OF MANKIND (1996). 
 4. Gerardo Ceballos, Paul R. Ehrlich & Rodolfo Dirzo, Biological Annihilation via the 
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deserves to be called the Anthropocene extinction.5 
Life on Earth overcomes mass extinction events on a temporal scale spanning 
millions of years. Full restoration of biodiversity after mass extinction requires 10 
million to 100 million years.6 By this measure, “the loss of genetic and species di-
versity” is probably the contemporary crisis “our descendants [will] most regret” and 
“are least likely to forgive.”7 Because “time is the longest distance between two 
places,”8 Edward Wilson has described biodiversity loss as the “scientific problem 
of great[est] immediate importance for humanity.”9 
To this concern we must add anthropogenic climate change. Scientific evidence 
attributing severe, even catastrophic, climate change to anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases has long passed the point of reasonable doubt.10 “[W]e can no 
longer postpone serious consideration” of proper responses to climate change.11 
American debates over climate change, scientifically and politically wretched as they 
are,12 have shifted from questions of causation to debates over the proper policy re-
sponse.13 
                                                                                                             
 
Ongoing Sixth Mass Extinction Signaled by Vertebrate Population Losses and Declines, 114 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E6089, E6089 (2017) (finding an “extremely high degree of population 
decay in vertebrates, even in common ‘species of low concern,’” and decrying the resulting “mas-
sive anthropogenic erosion of biodiversity and of the ecosystem services essential to civiliza-
tion”). 
 5. See, e.g., Will Steffen, Jacques Grinevald, Paul Crutzen & John McNeill, The 
Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL 
SOC’Y A 842, 843 (2011); Jan Zalasiewicz, Mark Williams, Will Steffen & Paul Crutzen, The 
New World of the Anthropocene, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2228, 2228 (2010). The term 
Anthropocene is derived from ἄνθρωπος and καινός, the ancient Greek words for “human” 
and “new” (or “recent”). See GREEK DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 30, 168. I have outlined an 
admittedly apocalyptic vision of agriculture and its regulation in the Anthropocene. See James 
Ming Chen, Anthropocene Agricultural Law, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 745 (2016). 
 6. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 330 (2d ed. 1999). 
 7. Endangered Species Act Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution 
of the Comm. on Env’t. and Pub. Works, 97th Cong. 366 (1981) (statement of Edward O. Wilson, 
Baird Professor of Science, Harvard University).  
 8. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, THE GLASS MENAGERIE 96 (New Directions Books 1999) (1945). 
 9. WILSON, supra note 6, at 254. 
 10. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1 [https://perma.cc/6T3S-
8TNK]; James Hansen et al., Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: Evidence from 
Paleoclimate Data, Climate Modeling, and Modern Observations That 2 °C Global Warming 
Could Be Dangerous, 16 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 3761 (2016).  
 11. Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2007); cf. Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 179 (2011) (proposing a mechanism for adjusting carbon taxes and emission permits 
according to time-variant climate outcomes). 
 12. See generally Anthony Leiserowitz, Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy 
Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 45 (2006). 
 13. Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1531, 1531 (2009); Carrie A. Scrufari, Tackling the Tenure Problem: Promoting Land 
Access for New Farmers as Part of a Climate Change Solution, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 497, 499 
(2017). 
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Biodiversity loss and climate change are closely related catastrophes.14 Indeed, 
within the framework of biodiversity loss, climate change represents an extreme var-
iation on the theme of habitat destruction. Large-scale habitat destruction through 
climate change threatens many plant and animal species with extinction. Although 
“organisms respond to climate and climatic change in a variety of ways, depending 
on the nature, rate and duration of the change, and the range of available biological 
responses,”15 paleontology has connected “[t]he three best-studied mass extinction 
events” to “sharp changes in climate.”16 Humility about the human impact on natural 
history and the biosphere provides ample reason to presume “that rapid shifts in cli-
mate can reduce global diversity.”17 
If indeed biodiversity loss and climate change have reached apocalyptic propor-
tions, it is fitting to describe the engines of extinction in equine terms. On the hippo-
drome of the gods, apocalyptic horsemen are riding roughshod over the face of the 
earth: “I looked, and there before me was a pale horse! Its rider was named Death, 
and Hades was following close behind him. They were given power over a fourth of 
the earth to kill by sword, famine, and plague, and by the wild beasts of the earth.”18 
Jared Diamond characterizes the deadly horsemen of the ecological apocalypse 
as an “Evil Quartet”: habitat destruction, overkill, introduced species, and secondary 
extinctions.19 Edward Wilson prefers an acronym derived from the ancient Greek 
                                                                                                             
 
 14. See Céline Bellard, Cleo Bertelsmeier, Paul Leadley, Wilfried Thuiller & Franck 
Courchamp, Impacts of Climate Change on the Future of Biodiversity, 15 ECOLOGY LETTERS 
365 (2012); Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate 
Change Impacts Across Natural Systems, 421 NATURE 37, 37 (2003); Robert L. Peters, 
Conservation of Biological Diversity in the Face of Climate Change, in GLOBAL WARMING AND 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 15, 21–22 (Robert L. Peters & Thomas E. Lovejoy eds., 1992); Stuart L. 
Pimm, Climate Disruption and Biodiversity, 19 CURRENT BIOL. R595 (2009); Terry L. Root, Jeff 
T. Price, Kimberly R. Hall, Stephen H. Schneider, Cynthia Rosenzweig & J. Alan Pounds, 
Fingerprints of Global Warming on Wild Animals and Plants, 421 NATURE 57, 57 (2003); cf. 
Herman E. Daly, Ecological Economics, 254 SCIENCE 358 (1991) (suggesting that global warm-
ing can threaten even Homo sapiens by destabilizing the human food supply). See generally 
Osvaldo E. Sala et al., Global Biodiversity Scenarios for the Year 2100, 287 SCIENCE 1770 (2000) 
(describing the potential ecological impact of land use, proliferation of exotic species, climate 
change, and the continued escalation of CO2 and N2 levels).  
 15. Douglas H. Erwin, Climate as a Driver of Evolutionary Change, 19 CURRENT 
BIOLOGY R575, R575 (2009). See generally Camille Parmesan, Ecological and Evolutionary 
Responses to Recent Climate Change, 37 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 
637 (2006); Andreas Schmittner, Nathan M. Urban, Jeremy D. Shakun, Natalie M. Mahowald, 
Peter U. Clark, Patrick J. Bartlein, Alan C. Mix & Antoni Rosell-Melé, Climate Sensitivity 
Estimated from Temperature Reconstructions of the Last Glacial Maximum, 334 SCIENCE 
1385 (2011). 
 16. Erwin, supra note 15, at R581. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Revelation 6:8 (New International Version). 
 19. See Jared Diamond, Overview of Recent Extinctions, in CONSERVATION FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37, 39–41 (David Western & Mary C. Pearl eds., 1989); see also Jared 
M. Diamond, “Normal” Extinctions of Isolated Populations, in EXTINCTIONS 191 (Matthew H. 
Nitecki ed., 1984). 
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word for “horse.”20 HIPPO represents Habitat destruction, Invasive species, 
Pollution, Population, and Overharvesting.21 Although conservation biologists have 
identified the leading causes of biodiversity loss, legal responses often fail to address 
distinct sources of human influence on evolutionary change. This Article takes a 
modest step toward remedying that shortcoming. 
Such “environmental and land-use ethics” as are “codified in law” today stem 
from an “era when the human population, at one-tenth its present size, tamed wilder-
ness with axe and ox.”22 Before the rise of Neolithic agriculture and the spread of 
sedentary human settlements across much of the globe’s surface, Wilson’s deadly 
HIPPO took the reverse sequence: OPPIH. The transmogrification of OPPIH to 
HIPPO over time frames the human impact on evolution in historical as well as bio-
logical terms.23 
The transition from OPPIH to HIPPO can be seen at all geographical scales, from 
the continental to the insular. In Paleolithic times, the overharvesting of large mam-
mals and flightless birds had a greater ecological impact than what was then “a still 
proportionately small amount of habitat destruction.”24 Whatever the precise mech-
anism elsewhere in the world,25 a human invasion bears primary responsibility for 
biodiversity loss in the western hemisphere.26 In North America, the sudden disap-
pearance 11,000 to 12,000 years ago of large mammals such as mammoths and 
ground sloths, after the continent’s megafauna had survived twenty-two glacial cy-
cles, suggests that this mass extinction may have arisen from “blitzkrieg.”27 Changes 
                                                                                                             
 
 20. See GREEK DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 164 (ἵππος). Contemporary English words in-
corporating this root include “hippocampus” (seahorse), “hippopotamus” (river-horse), and “hip-
podrome” (racetrack, or literally “horse-road”).  
 21. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 50–51 (2002). 
 22. David Tilman, Causes, Consequences and Ethics of Biodiversity, 405 NATURE 208, 210 
(2000). 
 23. For evaluations of the human impact on biodiversity before the rise of sedentary civili-
zations, see Richard G. Klein, The Impact of Early People on the Environment: The Case of 
Large Mammal Extinctions, in HUMAN IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT: ANCIENT ROOTS, 
CURRENT CHALLENGES 13 (Judith E. Jacobsen & John Firor eds., 1992); Paul S. Martin, 40,000 
Years of Extinctions on the “Planet of Doom,” 82 PALAEOGEOGRAPHY PALAEOCLIMATOLOGY 
PALAEOECOLOGY 187 (1990). 
 24. WILSON, supra note 21, at 50. 
 25. See generally Michael W. Beck, On Discerning the Cause of Late Pleistocene 
Megafaunal Extinctions, 22 PALEOBIOLOGY 91 (1996) (presenting different hypotheses for the 
extinctions of large mammals and birds during the late Pleistocene epoch). 
 26. See generally C Vance Haynes, Jr., Contributions of Radiocarbon Dating to the 
Geochronology of the Peopling of the New World, in RADIOCARBON AFTER FOUR DECADES: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 355 (R.E. Taylor, A. Long & R.S. Kra eds., 1992). 
 27. Cf. Jared M. Diamond, Quaternary Megafaunal Extinctions: Variations on a Theme by 
Paganini, 16 J. ARCHAEOLOGICAL SCI. 167, 169 (1989) (concluding ultimately that North 
American extinctions resulted not from blitzkrieg but from “sitzkrieg,” or prolonged human oc-
cupation of theretofore human-free ecosystems); David. W. Steadman & Paul S. Martin, 
Extinction of Birds in the Late Pleistocene of North America, in QUATERNARY EXTINCTIONS: A 
PREHISTORIC REVOLUTION 466 (Paul S. Martin & Richard G. Klein eds., 1984) (estimating 
twenty to forty avian extinctions due to ecological dependencies on the more than forty extinc-
tions of sloths, mammoths, mastodons, horses, tapirs, and other large North American mammals 
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in vegetation and climate stemming from the mass slaughter sealed North America’s 
biological fate.28 
The settlement of Polynesia, beginning 3500 to 3000 years before the present,29 
introduced three domesticated species of Eurasian provenance—pigs, dogs, and 
chickens—that simultaneously dictated the arc of economic development on each 
island and spelled doom for many of the islands’ endemic species.30 The enduring 
prominence of the words for pigs, dogs, and chickens in the Hawaiian language—
pua‘a, ‘īlio, moa31—pays linguistic homage to the centrality of animal husbandry in 
Polynesian culture before European contact.32 
Today, relative to these episodes across what is now the territory of the United 
States, “the principal cause of biodiversity loss is the fragmentation, degradation, and 
destruction of ecosystems and habitats through conversion of land to economically 
productive uses, especially agriculture, forestry, mineral and fossil fuel extraction, 
and urban development.”33 Global climate change represents an even more potent 
driver of ecological ruin and evolutionary change.34 
Prominent controversies over the constitutionality of endangered species protec-
tion35 have established awareness in American law of the utilitarian rationales for 
protecting biodiversity. The red wolf, it is said, inspires tourism in the southeastern 
                                                                                                             
 
during the Pleistocene epoch). The extent to which human colonization affected the ecology of 
North America is fiercely debated. See TIM FLANNERY, THE ETERNAL FRONTIER: AN ECOLOGICAL 
HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA AND ITS PEOPLES (2001); SHEPARD KRECH III, THE ECOLOGICAL 
INDIAN: MYTH AND HISTORY (1999); TED STEINBERG, DOWN TO EARTH: NATURE’S ROLE IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (2002). 
 28. See M.-O. Brault, L. A. Mysak, H. D. Matthews & C. T. Simmons, Assessing the Impact 
of Late Pleistocene Megafaunal Extinctions on Global Vegetation and Climate, 9 CLIMATE PAST 
1761, 1761–62 (2013); J. Tyler Faith, Late Pleistocene Climate Change, Nutrient Cycling, and 
the Megafaunal Extinctions in North America, 30 QUATERNARY SCI. REVIEWS 1675, 1676 
(2011). 
 29. See generally GEOFFREY IRWIN, THE PREHISTORIC EXPLORATION AND COLONISATION OF 
THE PACIFIC 64–105 (1992). 
 30. See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 60 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
 31. See MARY KAWENA PUKUI & SAMUEL H. ELBERT, NEW POCKET HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 
181, 38, 99 (1992).  
 32. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAI‘I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW 221–
42 (Sherry B. Ortner, Nicholas B. Dirks & Geoff Eley eds., 2000); PATRICK VINTON KIRCH, ON 
THE ROAD OF THE WINDS: AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS BEFORE 
EUROPEAN CONQUEST (2000). 
 33. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 34. See sources cited supra note 14. 
 35. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1 (2003); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the 
Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits 
of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723 (2002); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce 
Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998); Omar N. White, 
The Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the 
Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (2000). 
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United States.36 The Delhi Sands flower-loving fly epitomizes those insects that 
might be conscripted as future pollinators37 should honeybees ever fail38—a prospect 
that becomes likelier as colony collapse disorder spreads.39 The dual myths of bio-
piracy and bioprospecting persist, even though economic gains from medicinal ex-
ploitation of endangered species are speculative at best.40 Dreams of economic trans-
formation through pharmacology must be tempered by realities such as the failure of 
the Pacific yew to spur a biotechnology boom through the oncological exploitation 
of Taxol.41 Purely pecuniary interest in bioprospecting does tantalizingly promise the 
possibility of harnessing pharmaceutical companies into the business of biodiversity 
conservation by posing extinction as a bar to the patenting of drugs derived from 
species that have died out.42 
                                                                                                             
 
 36. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).  
 37. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 38. For discussions of the economic impact of insect pollinators, see GRETCHEN C. DAILY & 
KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION 
PROFITABLE (2002); John B. Loomis & Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and 
Endangered Species: Summary and Meta-Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 197 (1996); Leslie 
Richardson & John Loomis, Total Economic Valuation of Endangered Species: A Summary and 
Comparison of the United States and the Rest of the World Estimates, in CONSERVING AND 
VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND BIODIVERSITY: ECONOMIC, INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL 
CHALLENGES 25 (K.N. Ninan ed., 2009). 
 39. See, e.g., Peter Neumann & Norman L. Carreck, Honey Bee Colony Losses, 49 J. 
APICULTURAL RES. 1 (2010); Benjamin P. Oldroyd, What’s Killing American Honey Bees?, 5 
PLOS BIOLOGY 1195 (2007); Kristine M. Smith, Elizabeth H. Loh, Melinda K. Rostal, Carlos M. 
Zambrana-Torrelio, Luciana Mendiola & Peter Daszak, Pathogens, Pests, and Economics: 
Drivers of Honey Bee Colony Declines and Losses, 10 ECOHEALTH 434 (2013); Andrea Tapparo, 
Daniele Marton, Chiara Giorio, Alessandro Zanella, Lidia Soldà, Matteo Marzaro, Linda Vivan 
& Vincenzo Girolami, Assessment of the Environmental Exposure of Honeybees to Particulate 
Matter Containing Neonicotinoid Insecticides Coming from Corn Coated Seeds, 46 ENVTL. SCI. 
& TECH. 2592 (2012); Geoffrey R. Williams, David R. Tarpy, Dennis vanEngelsdorp, Marie-
Pierre Chauzat, Diana L. Cox-Foster, Keith S. Delaplane, Peter Neumann, Jeffrey S. Pettis, 
Richard E.L. Rogers & Dave Shutler, Colony Collapse Disorder in Context, 32 BIOESSAYS 845 
(2010). 
 40. See also Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the 
Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 844 (1997) (“Moral, aesthetic, and spir-
itual arguments amply may justify [biodiversity conservation], but an instrumental or economic 
rationale appears beyond reach.”). Compare Jim Chen, There’s No Such Thing as Biopiracy . . . 
And It’s a Good Thing Too, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2006), with James Ming Chen, Bioprospect 
Theory, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 19, 22 (2014) (“There simply is no defensible basis for treating 
ethnobiological knowledge as the foundation of a globally coherent approach to economic de-
velopment.”). On the apparent lack of connection between environmental quality and human 
well-being, see Ciara Raudsepp-Hearne, Garry D. Peterson, Maria Tengö, Elena M. Bennett, Tim 
Holland, Karina Benessaiah, Graham K. MacDonald & Laura Pfeifer, Untangling the 
Environmentalist’s Paradox: Why Is Human Well-Being Increasing as Ecosystem Services 
Degrade?, 60 BIOSCIENCE 576 (2010). 
 41. See generally JORDAN GOODMAN & VIVIEN WALSH, THE STORY OF TAXOL: NATURE AND 
POLITICS IN THE PURSUIT OF AN ANTI-CANCER DRUG (2001). 
 42. See Andrew W. Torrance, An Extinction Bar to Patentability, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 237 (2008); Andrew W. Torrance, Patent Law, HIPPO, and the Biodiversity Crisis, 9 J. 
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At the same time, however, the law fails to calibrate its remedies according to the 
severity of the biological threat. Perversely enough, the legal understanding of ex-
tinction mechanisms remains frozen in time, like an insect in amber or, more appro-
priately, a Chalcolithic (Copper Age) human in ice.43 Legal responses to biodiversity 
loss take primary aim at overkill and the marketing of products derived from 
endangered species. These are biological concerns more closely linked to phases of 
human history before its great acceleration through agriculture, urbanization, and in-
dustrial production. The legal enterprise of preventing extinctions would seem like-
lier to succeed if it addressed the most powerful causes of biodiversity loss today. 
Climate change, habitat destruction, and alien invasive species should figure more 
prominently than overkill in the law of biodiversity protection. 
Part II of this Article describes how the law seeks to preserve biodiversity by 
deterring overkill, habitat destruction, and the introduction of alien invasive species. 
The law imposes its clearest and harshest sanctions precisely where the drivers of 
extinction are weakest: when humans take conscious steps to capture or kill other 
living things for human gain. 
Part III more closely examines the use of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(ESA or “Act”)44 to address habitat destruction on private land and to mitigate cli-
mate change. Part IV concludes that the law’s lack of congruence with conservation 
biology impedes efforts to preserve biodiversity and mitigate climate change. It ac-
cordingly prescribes a wide range of responses, pragmatic as well as aspirational, 
that better align the law with the most daunting environmental challenges of the 
Anthropocene epoch. 
II. ACROSS THE APOCALYPSE ON HORSEBACK: 
LEGAL RESPONSES TO BIODIVERSITY LOSS 
A. Overkill 
In 1918, the fourth year of global warfare that would ultimately claim nine million 
military and seven million civilian casualties, a lethal influenza pandemic took hold. 
Between January 1918 and December 1920, the Spanish flu would kill between 50 
and 100 million people worldwide—some three to five percent of the human popu-
lation.45 
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At the front and at home, death came as a pale rider astride a pale horse.46 Perhaps 
not coincidentally, two stories of biodiversity loss, evocative of the Edwardian ex-
cess of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness,47 bracketed the years of the Great War. 
Amid the human slaughter, two of America’s iconic birds disappeared forever from 
the planet. 
In a certain sense, we have never recovered from witnessing the extermination of 
the Carolina parakeet and the passenger pigeon. These birds, respectively “temperate 
North America’s only native parrot”48 and quite probably the continent’s most abun-
dant bird (if not also its most abundant terrestrial vertebrate),49 became extinct at the 
Cincinnati Zoo four years apart. Martha, the last passenger pigeon, died on 
September 1, 1914; Incas, a male Carolina parakeet and the last of his kind, died on 
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AND VANISHING PARROTS: PROFILING EXTINCT AND ENDANGERED SPECIES (2017). 
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the continent’s avian population, accord JOEL GREENBERG, A FEATHERED RIVER ACROSS THE 
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February 21, 1918.50 The 1916 treaty at issue in Missouri v. Holland,51 perhaps one 
of the first legal enactments in the United States (or anywhere else in the world) to 
treat biodiversity conservation as “a national interest of very nearly the first magni-
tude,”52 focused exclusively on “the killing, capturing or selling . . . of . . . migratory 
birds.”53 
At least with respect to the passenger pigeon, humanity’s failure to recover from the 
extinction of a species is true in a very tangible sense. By eliminating the principal 
predator of ticks in northern forests, the extermination of the passenger pigeon may be 
fairly blamed for the rise in the human incidence of Lyme disease.54 
For their part, whether birds collectively exacted revenge on humanity through 
the Spanish flu remains a medical mystery.55 Throughout the Great War, birds and 
humans had maintained a morbid symbiosis. While men fought in their trenches, 
“The larks, still bravely singing, fl[ew] / Scarce heard amid the guns below.”56 As 
the Armistice took hold on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh 
month in 1918:  
[W]ithin half an hour of the guns falling silent the birds began to sing 
again. . . .  
[K]aum eine halbe Stunde nach dem Schweigen der Waffen [begannen] 
die Vögel . . . , wieder zu singen. . . .  
[U]ne demi-heure après que le silence des armes se fit, les oiseaux 
chantèrent à nouveau.57  
But not all the birds. Die Stimme mancher Vögel sind verloren worden. Pour 
toujours. 
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“Because they are so conspicuous and appealing to the human senses of sight and 
sound, birds always have attracted more than their fair share of our zoological atten-
tion.”58 To love birds is to wade in Henry David Thoreau’s “tonic of wildness,” those 
“marshes where the bittern and the meadow-hen lurk, and [to] hear the booming of 
the snipe; to smell the whispering sedge where only some wilder and more solitary 
fowl builds her nest.”59 The sandhill crane moved Aldo Leopold to observe: “Our 
ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the pretty. It expands 
through successive stages of the beautiful to values as yet uncaptured by language.”60 
Environmental law hears clearly, if only belatedly, the melody that the “nightingales 
. . . sang within the bloody wood.”61 
No environmental sin is graver, and no biological loss more irreversible, than ex-
tinction.62 Likewise, no vector of extinction is more emotionally gripping than direct, 
intentional killing. The paradigmatic act of converting wildlife to personal property 
through capture or slaughter63 remains the central focus of laws designed to protect 
endangered species. In the United States, section 9 of the Endangered Species Act64 
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flatly prohibits the “tak[ing]” of any protected species.65 “The term ‘take’” in turn 
“means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or 
to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”66 Section 9 so unequivocally condemns 
the killing or harassing of individual organisms that few litigated Endangered 
Species Act cases discuss this aspect of the statute. The killing of wolves, either 
with67 or without68 official sanction, dominates litigation over the deliberate targeting 
of individual members of protected species. One of the most prominent reported 
cases involving an attempt to “take” a member of a protected species69 actually arose 
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972.70 
The Endangered Species Act reveals an overt bias in favor of preventing direct 
takings of large, charismatic fauna over all other threats to biodiversity.71 The Act 
excludes certain insects from its protective aegis,72 even though insects are so essen-
tial to human welfare that if they “and other land-dwelling arthropods . . . were to 
disappear, humanity probably could not last more than a few months.”73 The reverse, 
assuredly, is not true: If humans should ever depart the planet, “among the immediate 
                                                                                                             
 
 65. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C). 
 66. Id. § 1532(19). 
 67. See Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985) (invalidating Department of 
Interior regulations that would have permitted the sport trapping of eastern timber wolves). 
 68. See United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding ESA penal-
ties levied against a rancher who shot and decapitated a gray wolf). 
 69. See United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859, 863–66 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that shooting 
at porpoises to discourage them from eating tuna did not fall within the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act’s definition of “take” under 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13)). 
 70. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361–1421 (West 2010 & West Supp. 2017). 
 71. See generally PAUL COLINVAUX, WHY BIG FIERCE ANIMALS ARE RARE: AN 
ECOLOGIST’S PERSPECTIVE 18, 31 (1978) (explaining the relative scarcity of large animals, espe-
cially predators, as a function of thermodynamics). 
 72. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012) (excluding from “[t]he term ‘endangered species’ . . . a 
species of the Class Insecta determined . . . to constitute a pest whose protection . . . would pre-
sent an overwhelming and overriding risk to man”). 
 73. WILSON, supra note 6, at 133. See generally THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSECTS 
AND THEIR ALLIES (Christopher O’Toole ed., 2002). On the concept of ecosystem services, 
see generally CONSERVING AND VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND BIODIVERSITY, supra 
note 38; NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen 
C. Daily ed., 1997); PANEL ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEMS, PRESIDENT’S COMM. OF 
ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., TEAMING WITH LIFE: INVESTING IN SCIENCE TO UNDERSTAND 
AND USE AMERICA’S LIVING CAPITAL (1998); Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, 
Economic Returns from the Biosphere, Commentary, 391 NATURE 629 (1998); Robert 
Costanza et al., The Value of Ecosystem Services: Putting the Issues in Perspective, 25 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 67 (1998); Janet S. Herman, David C. Culver & James Salzman, 
Groundwater Ecosystems and the Service of Water Purification, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 479 
(2001); H.A. Mooney, J. Lubchenco, R. Dirzo & O.E. Sala, Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Functioning: Basic Principles, in GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY ASSESSMENT 275, 282 (Vernon H. 
Heywood ed., 1995); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 
(1997) (reviewing NATURE’S SERVICES, supra); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie 
Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1136–
37 (1999). 
2018] THE FRAGILE MENAGERIE  315 
 
beneficiaries of our absence will be mosquitoes.”74 An apocalyptic collapse in insect 
populations may have already begun: A 27-year study has revealed a decline of more 
than 75% in flying insect biomass throughout Germany.75 
Moreover, even though “[t]he biological differences between animals and plants 
. . . offer no scientific reason for lesser protection of plants,”76 the Act significantly 
undervalues plants.77 Threatened and endangered plants are protected only insofar as 
they appear on federal land or are destroyed in knowing violation of state law.78 
Plants receive far fewer critical habitat designations than do threatened and 
endangered animals.79 In so doing, the Act perpetuates, rather than corrects, the com-
mon law’s baneful practice of treating plants as private property merely because they 
dwell on private land.80 The law’s failure to protect plants on equal footing with an-
imals represents a form of official “plant blindness.”81 
Trafficking in goods derived from endangered species remains the single act of 
biodiversity destruction on which international law has reached a punitive consensus. 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES),82 now ap-
proaching half a century in age, would represent a major step toward conserving bi-
odiversity, as long as one overlooks the fact that it does not work. The extension of 
CITES during the 1980s to “all aspects of trade and research” in orchids “immedi-
ately increased the desire for the plants, raised their market value dramatically, and 
led to even more collecting of rare orchid species from the wild.”83 Nothing in CITES 
stops developers and farmers who would “flood [critical] habitat with a hydroelectric 
dam, log it, level the hillsides for a road, build a golf course on the site, or burn the 
jungle to the ground for agricultural purposes.”84 Not surprisingly, “no reliable data” 
show “that CITES and similar efforts ha[ve] reduced smuggling, saved any orchid 
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species from extinction, helped protect orchid habitats, or even salvaged orchid 
plants facing . . . certain destruction.”85 
The raw emotional power of overkill, especially when it involves charismatic an-
imals such as elephants or tuna, subjects CITES and the Endangered Species Act to 
the cognitive biases that bedevil environmental decision making.86 For some time, 
controlled harvests for profit appeared to outperform direct regulation under CITES 
in deterring the poaching of elephants.87 Hopes that the elephant’s salvation might 
lie in commercialization, as it did with the American alligator88 or the Andean 
vicuña,89 have evaporated in 2016 with the United States’ imposition of a nearly total 
ban on the ivory trade.90 Meanwhile, an effort to protect the Atlantic bluefin tuna 
under CITES collapsed in 2010 as the European nations most heavily involved in the 
bluefin harvest initially supported but eventually abstained from the listing deci-
sion.91 On land and at sea, the focus on politically explosive but environmentally 
secondary acts of overkill and commercial exploitation has rendered CITES tragi-
cally impotent.  
B. Alien Invasive Species 
In an increasingly interconnected world, human ecological mismanagement often 
takes the form of introducing one or more invasive species.92 “[M]ost invasions have 
                                                                                                             
 
 85. Id. at 262. 
 86. See, e.g., James Ming Chen, Fables of the Reconstruction: Human Emotion and 
Behavioral Heuristics in Environmental Economics, 63 STUDIA IURIDICA 77 (2016); Justin Pidot, 
Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 BYU L. REV. 213, 235–43 (2013). 
 87. See EDWARD B. BARBIER, JOANNE C. BURGESS, TIMOTHY M. SWANSON & DAVID W. 
PEARCE, ELEPHANTS, ECONOMICS AND IVORY 132–38 (1990); FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, COSTING 
THE EARTH: THE CHALLENGE FOR GOVERNMENTS, THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUSINESS 132–41 
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Press 1992) (1991); Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the 
Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990). 
 88. Cf. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 495 (4th Cir. 2000) (reporting the successful recov-
ery of the American alligator from the United States’ endangered species list in 1975 to a con-
temporary market for its hides); Catharine L. Krieps, Comment, Sustainable Use of Endangered 
Species Under CITES: Is It a Sustainable Alternative?, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 461, 479–80 
(1996) (describing the creation of a market in alligator products as a spur for the conservation of 
alligators and their habitats). 
 89. See Gabriela Lichtenstein, Vicuña Conservation and Poverty Alleviation? Andean 
Communities and International Fibre Markets, 4 INT’L J. COMMONS 100 (2010). See generally 
SARA J. SCHERR, ANDY WHITE & DAVID KAIMOWITZ, MAKING MARKETS WORK FOR FOREST 
COMMUNITIES (2002); Pulp Friction, ECONOMIST (Mar. 14, 2002), http://www.economist.com 
/node/1033859 [https://perma.cc/5UQZ-M3S6].  
 90. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of the Section 4(d) Rule 
for the African Elephant (Loxodonta africana), 81 Fed. Reg. 36,388 (June 6, 2016) (to be codified 
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4245 (codifying the Endangered Species Act 
Amendments of 1988 and the African Elephant Conservation Act). 
 91. See D.G. Webster, The Irony and the Exclusivity of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Management, 
35 MARINE POL’Y 249 (2011); see also Carl Safina & Dane H. Klinger, Collapse of Bluefin Tuna 
in the Western Atlantic, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 243 (2008). 
 92. See, e.g., David S. Wilcove, David Rothstein, Jason Dubow, Ali Phillips & Elizabeth 
Losos, Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 609 
2018] THE FRAGILE MENAGERIE  317 
 
a weak impact,” but on occasion “an invasive species [is] capable of precipitating 
monumental changes to an ecosystem.”93 For example, introducing the Nile perch 
into Lake Victoria devastated endemic cichlids.94 Oceanic ecosystems fare no better. 
Barnacles, mollusks, worms, and hydroids leaving warmer seas on a flotilla of 
wooden fragments and buoyant pumice threaten the integrity of Arctic and Antarctic 
waters.95 
North American birds face multiple threats from alien invasive species.96 Feral 
cats, perhaps 100 million strong, constitute “a non-native predator that is creating 
havoc for certain native [bird] species” in the United States.97 Starlings, a scourge to 
many native birds, entered North America by virtue of a single man’s perverse ob-
session to import all birds mentioned by Shakespeare.98 Efforts to reverse the damage 
by exterminating starlings have failed.99 Exotics have suppressed or eliminated native, 
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often endemic, species in the Everglades, the Great Lakes, the Hawaiian Islands, and 
Guam.100 
Freed from competitive pressures in their native environment, invasive plants of-
ten thrive in particularly pernicious ways. Switching from sexual to asexual propa-
gation has fueled the Japanese knotweed’s conquest of new terrain as far away as the 
British Isles.101 Dandelion, already asexually reproducing in North America upon 
being liberated from predators and competitors in its native Eurasia, would flourish 
in an atmosphere with higher levels of carbon dioxide.102  
As overall biological diversity decreases, the environmental impact of invasive 
species will probably increase. If “simplified communities are more vulnerable to 
invasion,” then “we should also expect an increase in frequency of successful in-
vaders as well as an increase in their impact.”103 Repeated cycles of extirpation and 
invasion, whether intentional or inadvertent, “can, and eventually will, invoke major 
shifts in community structure and dynamics.”104 In this game of ecological roulette, 
the disturbances with the “greatest ecological impact frequently incur high societal 
costs.”105 
Existing law offers few if any answers to the problem of invasive species. The 
Plant Protection Act of 2000106 does enable the Department of Agriculture to con-
strict the movement of organisms known or suspected to have an adverse effect on 
agriculture.107 This law, however, serves more to regulate the proposed releases of 
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genetically modified crops108 than to provide broad-based authority to restrain the 
spread of invasive species. 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)109 provides a broader legal plat-
form. Among other purposes, NEPA aspires “to promote efforts which will prevent 
or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere” and “to enrich the under-
standing of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation.”110 
As a charter embodying the goals of sustainability, NEPA seeks “to foster and pro-
mote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and 
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other 
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”111 In particular, envi-
ronmental impact statements issued under NEPA must address “any irreversible and 
irretrievable commitments of resources.”112 In economic theory as in legal doctrine, 
irreversibility warrants a precautionary exception to the otherwise risk-neutral 
weighing of costs and benefits.113 
In principle, these statutory elements could infuse NEPA with some power to 
counter the spread of invasive species. One federal court of appeals has used NEPA 
to require a federal agency to address how dam construction could introduce zebra 
mussels into previously uninfested waters.114 NEPA could—and should—be con-
strued as embracing the Supreme Court’s recognition that “nonnative species . . .  
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could disturb [local] aquatic ecology to an unpredictable extent by competing with 
native fish for food or habitat, by preying on native species, or by disrupting the 
environment in more subtle ways,” such as the introduction of parasites.115 
More typically, however, NEPA proves impotent to curb invasions. Rejecting ar-
guments that airport expansion could dramatically increase the rate at which com-
mercial flights (especially from Asia) would introduce alien species into Maui, the 
Ninth Circuit declined to find a NEPA violation.116 That court took refuge in the 
vagaries of airport demand projections,117 the multiplicity of invasion vectors,118 and 
the impossibility of determining ex ante which species would become established 
and, among those, which would become “economic pests.”119 
The legal stance toward invasive species in other jurisdictions may be even more 
destructive. Even though there is no way to prevent farmed fish from escaping their 
pens,120 Brazil has considered “naturalizing” non-native species by decree in an ef-
fort to promote freshwater aquaculture.121 Legal and scientific safeguards against the 
catastrophic, irreversible effects of alien invasive species have fallen by the wayside 
in Brazil’s rush to develop its biologically sensitive interior.122 Such disregard for the 
western hemisphere’s greatest storehouse of biological diversity “makes a mockery” 
of legal efforts to identify environmental impacts and soften their negative 
consequences.123 
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Even within the inherently global challenge of biodiversity conservation, invasive 
species pose a daunting obstacle for legal systems rooted in geographically defined 
notions of sovereignty. Biodiversity loss as a “diffuse, cross-jurisdictional” crisis 
defies “haphazard local encouragement” and requires cooperative solutions.124 
“[E]nvironmental interconnection has become too real to ignore”; the “existence of 
transboundary communities inevitably creates a drive away from localism in all 
spheres.”125 No country can seek refuge in localism, even at a continental scale, from 
its responsibility to engage “transboundary communities” in addressing environmen-
tal problems that ignore political borders.126 
In short, no single country can contain the scourge posed by alien invasive spe-
cies. Within the inherently global project of biodiversity conservation, any hope of 
addressing alien invasive species demands especially vigorous dedication to interna-
tional cooperation.127 The Convention on Biological Diversity exhorts its contracting 
parties, “as far as possible and as appropriate,” to “[p]revent the introduction of, con-
trol or eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or spe-
cies.”128 The United States’ persistent refusal to sign the Convention,129 however, 
effectively short-circuits international law’s potential to spur domestic legal change. 
American withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, effective in 
2020, further undermines constructive feedback between domestic and international 
environmental law.130 
C. Habitat Destruction and Public Land Management 
1. Island Biogeography  
Habitat destruction threatens even deeper biodiversity loss.131 Whereas foraging  
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activities—hunting, fishing, gathering—often focus on particular species of utilitar-
ian interest (or practical inconvenience) to humans,132 comprehensive conversion of 
land for human use withdraws habitat indiscriminately from the full spectrum of 
fauna and flora. Contracting the physical range of endangered species spurs their 
extinction.133 Island biogeography posits that a reduction in the area of a biological 
island—which may consist of an island in the geographic sense or merely an isolated 
patch of wildlife habitat—predicts a mathematically related reduction in that area’s 
biological carrying capacity as measured by the number of distinct species that can 
be sustained.134 
The most elementary mathematical formula expressing the species-area relation-
ship is: 
S = c × Az 
where S represents the number of species, A represents the area, and c and z are em-
pirically determined constants.135 Taking the logarithm of both sides of that equa-
tion—by any base, including e (Euler’s constant) or 10, as long as it is applied to 
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each side—allows the presentation of the species-area relationship in linear form on 
a log-log plot: 
log S = log c + z  × log A 
The related semilog model found favor in the early twentieth century antecedents 
of island biogeography, which consolidated the work of nineteenth century pioneers 
such as Charles Darwin, Joseph Hooker, and Alfred Russel Wallace:136 
S = log(c × Az) 
The practical difference between the logarithmic and semilogarithmic models is that 
the semilog model depicts area, as the independent variable, on a linear rather than a 
logarithmic scale along the horizontal axis. Log-log plots of the basic species-area 
relationship originated with Philip Darlington’s celebrated 1957 illustration of the 
number of amphibian and reptile species on islands of varying size in the West 
Indies.137 
Despite considerable advances in island biogeography,138 including the precise 
connection between species and area,139 log-log plots continue to illustrate the spe-
cies-area relationship. A more recent example illustrates the number of amphibian, 
avian, and mammalian species at the continental scale for the world’s five largest 
land masses (Africa, Eurasia, North America, South America, Australia).140 
Biologically catastrophic episodes of habitat destruction recur with alarming fre-
quency. Large-scale damming, as typified by California’s Hetch Hetchy 
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Reservoir,141 Egypt’s Aswan High Dam,142 and China’s Three Gorges Dam,143 can 
likewise erase multiple ecological niches in a single blow. An area as large and di-
verse as Centinela, a diverse forest ridge in Ecuador, can fall to victim to cacao cul-
tivation.144 Destroying large chunks of the earth’s physical infrastructure within a 
time frame that is effectively instantaneous by geological standards significantly ac-
celerates the rate of evolutionary change attributable to human activity. 
One study of regional extinctions of birds, butterflies, and vascular plants in 
Britain illustrates the effects of habitat destruction as an irreversible experiment in 
island biogeography.145 Earlier studies of global biodiversity had exhaustively docu-
mented extinctions among plants, vertebrates, and certain mollusks.146 These studies 
shed relatively little light on the global scope of biodiversity loss insofar as they did 
not cover organisms representing a sufficiently large sample of Earth’s described 
species. 
Insect species, however, represent a considerable portion of all fauna.147 
Decreases of 28% among native plant species, 54% of native bird species, and 71% 
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of butterfly species in Britain therefore raise more serious concerns.148 “The greater 
loss among British butterfly species may foreshadow similar declines in birds and 
plants, because insect populations typically respond more rapidly to adverse envi-
ronmental change than longer-lived organisms or those with dormant propagules.”149 
Further confirmation of declines among insect populations akin to those already doc-
umented in taxa whose species abundance is better understood will clarify the precise 
extent to which habitat destruction, on scales as large as Great Britain or even larger, 
threatens the biosphere.150 
2. Public Lands Management 
 Traditionally, much of the American legal apparatus for habitat conservation has 
focused on public lands. Although “[t]he Endangered Species Act of 1973 was mo-
tivated in part by the need to [regulate] beyond the limited confines of federal 
land,”151 a significant degree of habitat conservation takes place under the aegis of 
public land management. Pending Part III’s more comprehensive overview of the 
Endangered Species Act, we can profitably examine this aspect of biodiversity con-
servation policy in the United States as part of our broader overview of legal 
measures against habitat destruction. 
Federal public lands law rests on the primary premise of “multiple use,”152 defined 
as a range of uses “including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, 
watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical values.”153 
Because “[m]ultiple use posits that all uses from commodity extraction and produc-
tion to biodiversity conservation are equal,” this principle “both supports and hinders 
biodiversity conservation.”154 
                                                                                                             
 
 148. See Thomas et al., supra note 3, at 1879–80. 
 149. Id. at 1880 (footnote omitted). See generally A. Erhardt & J. A. Thomas, Lepidoptera 
as Indicators of Change in the Semi-Natural Grasslands of Lowland and Upland Europe, in THE 
CONSERVATION OF INSECTS AND THEIR HABITATS 213 (N. M. Collins & J. A. Thomas eds., 1991); 
Amy E. M. Waltz & W. Wallace Covington, Ecological Restoration Treatments Increase 
Butterfly Richness and Abundance: Mechanisms of Response, 12 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 85 
(2004). 
 150. See Hallmann et al., supra note 75; Michael L. McKinney, High Rates of Extinction and 
Threat in Poorly Studied Taxa, 13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1273 (1999). 
 151. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 494 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Davina Kari Kaile, Note, 
Evolution of Wildlife Legislation in the United States: An Analysis of the Legal Efforts To Protect 
Endangered Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 456 
(1993); cf. Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1281 (D. Haw. 1998) 
(invalidating a decision not to designate critical habitat insofar as that decision was based solely 
on a claim that some of the species at issue were located on private land, without determining 
whether a decision not to designate might be appropriate when a species exists solely on private 
land). 
 152. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (2012) (directing that “management [of public land] be on 
the basis of multiple use and sustained yield unless otherwise specified by law”). 
 153. Id. § 1702(c). 
 154. A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation in the United States: A Case Study in 
Incompleteness and Indirection, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,529, 10,540–41 (2002). 
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When it first appeared, the concept of multiple use represented a substantial im-
provement in federal land management policy. “[I]ncreased competition for forage” 
among cattle and sheep ranchers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
“led . . . to overgrazing, diminished profits, and hostility among forage competi-
tors.”155 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)156 explic-
itly adopted two statutory principles: “multiple use” for recreation, range, timber, 
mineral extraction, wildlife and fish habitat, and natural, scenic, scientific, and his-
torical uses;157 and “sustained yield” of renewable resources.158 At the same time, 
FLPMA retained “first priority” for existing grazing permit holders as long as federal 
land-use planning continued to leave land “available for domestic livestock 
grazing.”159 
Although a statutory commitment to multiple use may theoretically “provide[] the 
legal foundation for a management decision to preserve biodiversity,”160 disputes 
over federal land management expose a bias favoring commercialization over con-
servation.161 When the Department of the Interior tried in 1995 to “accelerat[e] res-
toration” of rangelands by making its managerial approach “more compatible with 
ecosystem management,”162 incumbent ranchers argued in response that the Interior 
Department was legally obliged to “safeguard” livestock interests’ reliance on the 
perpetuation of grazing privileges.163 This argument ran squarely against an explicit 
statutory command that neither “the creation of a grazing district [n]or the issuance 
of a permit . . . shall . . . create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.”164 
Other decisions have demonstrated the willingness of federal land management 
agencies to favor grazing and other historically privileged land uses over conserva-
tion and other non-use values. A federal district court was forced to remind federal 
land managers in 1985 that grazing “[p]ermittees must be kept under a sufficiently 
real threat of cancellation or modification in order to adequately protect the public 
lands from overgrazing or other forms of mismanagement.”165 In spite of its statutory 
mandate to maintain “final control and decisionmaking authority over livestock 
grazing practices on the public lands,” the federal government had all but ceded ju-
risdiction over grazing permits.166 
                                                                                                             
 
 155. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 732 (2000). See generally DEBRA L. 
DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED: REMOVING LIVESTOCK FROM PUBLIC LANDS TO 
CONSERVE NATIVE BIODIVERSITY (1999). 
 156. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–
1785). 
 157. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012). 
 158. Id. § 1702(h). 
 159. Id. § 1752(c). 
 160. Tarlock, supra note 154, at 10,541. 
 161. See, e.g., United States v. State, 23 P.3d 117, 128 (Idaho 2001) (arguing that reservation 
of water for a wildlife refuge would unfairly subordinate rights to “water intended to be stored 
and regulated by colossal federal projects for the past 98 years” for the primary purpose of rec-
lamation). 
 162. See Grazing Adm’n—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 9901 (Feb. 22, 1995). 
 163. See Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 741 (2000). 
 164. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2012); see Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 741–42. 
 165. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 871 (E.D. Cal. 1985). 
 166. Id. at 871; see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1908 (2012). 
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The desire to protect grazing livestock from wolves has nullified other environ-
mental gains from habitat conservation. Setting aside public land as a wildlife pre-
serve, while conducting government-sponsored wolf shoots from helicopters, results 
in net negative effects on wolf populations.167 
The priority accorded to grazing and other consumptive uses is especially galling 
on its own terms: economic valuation. Environmental economics has long recog-
nized that non-use values can vastly exceed gains from the direct, immediate extrac-
tion of living things.168 The Canadian polar bear population, for instance, might be 
worth $600,000 as bushmeat, versus $6 billion in “estimate[d] . . . value Canadians 
would have placed on the preservation of [this] iconic species”169—to say nothing of 
the bear’s potential influence on climate change policy in the scientifically intransi-
gent country neighboring Canada.170 
On the whole, federal land management policy concentrates its habitat preserva-
tion efforts on tracts designated as “wilderness.” “A wilderness, in contrast with 
those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is . . . an area 
where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man him-
self is a visitor who does not remain.”171 Unlike other public lands, wilderness areas 
fulfill their function solely by virtue of remaining “in their natural condition.”172 
Wilderness preservation helps ensure “that an increasing population, accompanied 
                                                                                                             
 
 167. See Joshua H. Schmidt, John W. Burch & Margaret C. MacCluskie, Effects of Control 
on the Dynamics of an Adjacent Protected Wolf Population in Interior Alaska, 198 WILDLIFE 
MONOGRAPHS 1 (2017). 
 168. See, e.g., John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1967); 
John B. Loomis & Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and Endangered Species: 
Summary and Meta-Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 197 (1996). 
 169. ÉCORESSOURCES CONSULTANTS, EVIDENCE OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF 
POLAR BEARS FOR CANADA, at vi (2011); see also id. at 26 (using “the benefit-transfer method” 
to estimate that Canadian households “would pay approximately $508 per year” to preserve 
the polar bear, for an estimated total of “$6,320 million/year”); Richardson & Loomis, supra 
note 38. Any ambiguity in the ÉcoRessources analysis can be resolved by applying its one 
clear figure of $508 per household. According to the Canadian census, the population of 
Canada was 35,151,728 in 2016. See Population and Dwelling Counts, for Canada, Provinces 
and Territories, 2016 and 2011 Censuses—100% Data, STAT. CAN. http://www12.statcan.gc. 
ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/hlt-fst/pd-pl/Table.cfm [https://perma.cc/K4X7-D7R9] 
(last updated Aug. 28, 2017). In 2011, the date of the ÉcoRessources report, the country’s 
population was 33,476,688. See id. Dividing the population by 3 yields a reasonable estimate 
of 11 million to 12 million households. Multiplying that figure by $508 yields an approximate 
total of $6 billion—in Canadian dollars. As of November 2017, real-time currency exchange 
rates on http://www.xe.com [https://perma.cc/6RJZ-9BBM] report a rate of approximately 
0.79 United States dollars for every 1.00 Canadian dollars.  The figure in text may therefore 
be interpreted as $5 billion in American currency equivlent.  
 170. See infra Part III.C. 
 171. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2012); cf., e.g., Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Singleton, 47 F. Supp. 2d 
1182, 1192 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that “the explicit ‘protect and enhance’ language of” the Wild 
and Scenic Rivers Act “requires that watersheds be maintained in a primitive condition and the 
waters kept unpolluted”). 
 172. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2012). 
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by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify” 
the entire physical surface of the earth.173 
“The global extent of the human footprint,” made manifest by the sheer scarcity 
of truly wild places, makes humans the final “stewards of nature, whether we like it 
or not.”174 This responsibility includes “a commitment to conserving the last of the 
wild—those few places, in all the biomes around the globe, that are relatively less 
influenced by human beings—before they are gone.”175 
Cold and high-elevation wilderness areas, however, cannot anchor a comprehen-
sive and effective biodiversity program.176 Biodiverse “hot spots,” rich in species, 
typically live up to their name: most such locales lie in the tropics.177 Even a conser-
vation strategy focused on hot spots, however, overlooks ecosystem services, phylo-
genetic diversity, and other forms of species richness.178 Moreover, emphasizing hot 
spots may take little to no account of costs available for conservation and, as a result, 
may fail to achieve optimal resource allocation.179 
Ultimately, neither the “wilderness” principle nor broader aspects of public lands 
management in the United States provide adequate protection for biodiversity. The 
National Park Service—which is directed to “conserve the scenery, natural and his-
toric objects, and wild life” in the most spectacular federal lands and to “leave them 
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations”180—was designed to preserve  
 
                                                                                                             
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Eric W. Sanderson, Malanding Jaiteh, Marc A. Levy, Kent H. Redford, Antoinette V. 
Wannebo & Gillian Woolmer, The Human Footprint and the Last of the Wild, 52 BIOSCIENCE 
891, 902 (2002). 
 175. Id. at 903. 
 176. See Jonathan S. Adams, Bruce A. Stein & Lynn S. Kutner, Biodiversity: Our Precious 
Heritage, in PRECIOUS HERITAGE: THE STATUS OF BIODIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 17 
(Bruce A. Stein, Lynn S. Kutner & Jonathan S. Adams eds., 2000); Tarlock, supra note 154, at 
10,542. 
 177. See John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots 
Legislation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1157–58 (2001); Norman Myers, The Biodiversity 
Challenge: Expanded Hot-Spots Analysis, 10 ENVIRONMENTALIST 243 (1990); Norman Myers, 
Threatened Biotas: “Hot Spots” in Tropical Forests, 8 ENVIRONMENTALIST 187 (1988); Norman 
Myers, Russell A. Mittermeier, Cristina G. Mittermeier, Gustavo A. B. da Fonseca & Jennifer 
Kent, Biodiversity Hotspots for Conservation Priorities, 403 NATURE 853 (2000). 
 178. See Peter Kareiva & Michelle Marvier, Conserving Biodiversity Coldspots, 91 AM. 
SCIENTIST 344 (2003). 
 179. See Hugh P. Possingham & Kerrie A. Wilson, Turning Up the Heat on Hotspots, 436 
NATURE 919 (2005). For a proposed method for cost-effective ranking of priorities for biodiver-
sity conservation and a critical application of that method, compare Martin L. Weitzman, The 
Noah’s Ark Problem, 66 ECONOMETRICA 1279 (1998), with David W. Martin, Noah Revisits 
Biodiversity Prioritization, 7 MOD. ECON. 1272 (2016). 
 180. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (Supp. 2016); accord Nat’l Park & Conservation Ass’n v. 
Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 1999). Before 2014, the National Park Service’s iconic 
declaration of purpose boasted the commensurately iconic statutory citation of 16 U.S.C. § 1. See 
Pub. L. No. 113-287, § 7, 128 Stat. 3094, 3273 (2014) (repealing old 16 U.S.C. § 1); id. § 3, 128 
Stat. at 3096 (recodifying 16 U.S.C. § 1 as 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a)); Sierra Club v. Salazar, 177 
F. Supp. 3d 512, 516 n.2 (D.D.C. 2016) (acknowledging the statutory reorganization). 
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geological wonders, not to serve broader ecological purposes.181 Wilderness policy, 
in microcosm, reveals the overall weakness of laws addressing biodiversity loss. 
Laws designed to prevent biodiversity loss behave like a twisted version of Wee 
Willie Keeler—aiming environmental law “where they ain’t.”182 
III. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, 
FROM PRIVATE LANDS TO GLOBAL COMMONS 
Having examined legal tools of varying effectiveness in addressing overkill, alien 
invasive species, and habitat destruction on public lands, I will now focus on the 
Endangered Species Act.183 Whatever its shortcomings, the Act deserves credit for 
“preventing the ultimate extinction of the vast majority of protected species.”184 The 
Act represents “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endan-
gered species ever enacted by any nation.”185 American environmental law affords 
“endangered species . . . the highest of priorities.”186 The otherwise dismal record of 
biodiversity protection does reflect some progress in forestalling specific extinc-
tion187 and in preserving particular swaths of critical habitat.188 
Part III begins by outlining the mechanics of the Endangered Species Act. It then 
addresses two of the most important applications of this statute: preventing habitat 
destruction on private lands and protecting biodiversity from the effects of climate 
change. 
                                                                                                             
 
 181. See RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY 
2–3 (1997). 
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A. Endangered Species Act Mechanics 
1. Listing Endangered and Threatened Species  
The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) (known together as the “Services”) collectively enforce the Endangered 
Species Act. The FWS administers the Act for terrestrial and freshwater species, 
while the NMFS administers the Act for most marine species.189 Maritime mammals 
straddle both sides of this jurisdictional divide. Polar bears, dugongs, manatees, wal-
ruses, and sea and marine otters fall on the FWS side.190 The NMFS governs whales, 
dolphins, porpoises, sea lions, and seals.191 A species is defined as “endangered” if it 
“is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”192 A 
                                                                                                             
 
 189. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2016); Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,926 (June 3, 1986) (“Generally, marine species are under 
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce and all other species are under the jurisdiction 
of the Secretary of the Interior.”). 
 190. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361–1421 (West 
2010 & West Supp. 2017), defines a “marine mammal” as “any mammal which (A) is 
morphologically adapted to the marine environment (including sea otters and members of 
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environment (such as the polar bear).” Id. § 1362(6); accord 50 C.F.R. § 14.102 (2016) 
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as “an individual of a species of the orders Cetacea, Pinnipedia, or Sirenia, or a polar bear 
(Ursus maritimus) or sea otter (Enhydra lutris)”); see also In re Polar Bear Endangered 
Species Listing & § 4(a) Rule Litig., 818 F. Supp. 2d 240, 246 (D.D.C. 2011) (“The 
Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction over most marine mammals . . . including the polar 
bear.”), aff’d, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The MMPA divides responsibility for marine 
mammals between the Secretary of Commerce, who is responsible for “members of the 
order Cetacea and members, other than walruses, of the order Pinnipedia,” and the Secretary 
of the Interior, who is responsible for “all other marine mammals.” 16 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1362(12)(A)(i)–(ii) (West 2010). The Endangered Species Act likewise reflects this 
jurisdictional boundary between the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior. See 16 
U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2012) (defining “Secretary” as either the Secretary of Commerce or the 
Interior, according to Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,627 (Oct. 6, 
1970), 5 U.S.C. app. 1 (2012)). 
 191. In accord with statutory authorities cited supra note 190, regulations issued jointly 
by FWS and by NMFS assign jurisdiction to the Secretary of Commerce (who supervises 
NMFS) “over members of the order Cetacea and members, other than walruses, of the order 
Pinnipedia.” 50 C.F.R. § 403.02(f). “[T]he Secretary of the Interior,” who supervises FWS, 
“has jurisdiction over all other mammals.” Id. Incidentally, this regulation mistakenly cites 
§ 3(11) instead of § 3(12) of the MMPA, which is the true source of statutory authority. See 
MMPA, Pub. L. No. 92-522, § 3(12), 86 Stat. 1027, 1029 (1972). Consequently, NMFS 
regulations define marine mammals as “Cetacea (whales, dolphins, and porpoises) and 
Pinnipedia, other than walruses (seals and sea lions),” 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (2016), while FWS 
regulations confine themselves to the polar bear, walrus, dugong, two species of otter, and 
three species of manatee, see id. § 18.3; see also id. § 18.2 (deferring all regulation of 
cetaceans, seals, and sea lions to 50 C.F.R. part 216). 
 192. ESA § 3(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012). 
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“threatened species” is one “which is likely to become an endangered species within 
the foreseeable future.”193 
Of particular interest in the context of climate change is the time frame deemed 
“foreseeable.” Because neither the Act nor its implementing regulations define the 
term “foreseeable future,” the Services determine foreseeability on a case-by-case 
basis.194 Definitions of foreseeability have varied considerably. One federal district 
court has declined to decide whether a risk that the coho salmon might become 
endangered within “30 or 100 years” satisfied the statutory definition of foreseeable 
future, because an administrative determination that this species “would not become 
endangered within the next two years” would “fall[] far short of any reasonable def-
inition of the ‘foreseeable future.’”195 
Another court has noted—albeit without endorsement or rejection—the assump-
tion that twenty-four years constitutes the foreseeable future for purposes of predict-
ing the likelihood of endangerment.196 Listing decisions involving salamanders have 
set foreseeability at forty years.197 Amphibians such as salamanders have been on the 
forefront of biological assessments signaling catastrophic declines in diversity, since 
amphibians are “more threatened and are declining more rapidly than either birds or 
mammals.”198 
By contrast, one court has held that the same forty-year time horizon, from 2010 
to 2050, as identified in projections of deleterious effects from climate change, was 
not sufficiently foreseeable to warrant the listing of the ribbon seal as a threatened 
species.199 The FWS, of its own accord, has declined to list the American pika as 
threatened or endangered on the basis of climate change risks beyond 2050.200 
                                                                                                             
 
 193. ESA § 3(20), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2012). 
 194. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing, 709 F.3d at 15. 
 195. Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1151 (D. Or. 1998). 
 196. See Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 645 F. Supp. 2d 929, 954 n.18 (D. Or. 2007). 
 197. See 12-Month Finding on a Petition To List the Siskiyou Mountains Salamander 
(Plethodon Stormi) and Scott Bar Salamander (Plethodon Asupak) as Threatened or 
Endangered, 73 Fed. Reg. 4380, 4381 (Jan. 24, 2008). 
 198. Simon N. Stuart, Janice S. Chanson, Neil A. Cox, Bruce E. Young, Ana S. L. Rodrigues, 
Debra L. Fischman & Robert W. Waller, Status and Trends of Amphibian Declines and 
Extinctions Worldwide, 306 SCIENCE 1783, 1783 (2004). See generally Andrew R. Blaustein, 
Stephanie S. Gervasi, Pieter T. J. Johnson, Jason T. Hoverman, Lisa K. Belden, Paul W. Bradley 
& Gisselle Y. Xie, Ecophysiology Meets Conservation: Understanding the Role of Disease in 
Amphibian Population Declines, 367 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1688 (2012); 
Andrew R. Blaustein, Barbara A. Han, Rick A. Relyea, Pieter T.J. Johnson, Julia C. Buck, 
Stephanie S. Gervasi & Lee B. Kats, The Complexity of Amphibian Population Declines: 
Understanding the Role of Cofactors in Driving Amphibian Losses, 1223 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. 
SCI. 108 (2011).  
 199. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2010); 
cf. Rocky Mountain Wild v. Walsh, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1250–51 (D. Colo. 2016) (allowing 
FWS, in a decision not to list two species of beardtongue wildflowers as threatened or 
endangered, to consider both the probability and the improbability of future commercial de-
velopment). 
 200. See 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List the American Pika as Threatened or 
Endangered, 75 Fed. Reg. 6438 (Feb. 9, 2010). See generally Erik A. Beever, Peter F. Brussard 
& Joel Berger, Patterns of Apparent Extirpation Among Isolated Populations of Pikas 
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Listing as an endangered or threatened species is a prerequisite to protection under 
the Act. “The ESA’s protection of a species and its habitat is triggered only when 
FWS [or NMFS] ‘lists’ a species in danger of becoming extinct as either 
‘endangered’ or ‘threatened.’”201 The Services’ regulations explain why listing and 
its mirror image, delisting, have such overriding legal significance: “[t]he principal 
goal” of the Act “is to return listed species to a point at which protection . . . is no 
longer required.”202 If, and “only if the best scientific and commercial data available 
indicate that [a species] is no longer endangered or threatened,” that “species may be 
delisted” and reassigned to the default state of nonprotection for species not listed as 
endangered or threatened.203 
The Services must base their listing decisions on five factors: 
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of 
a species’ habitat or range; 
(B) overutilization of a species for commercial, recreational, scientific, 
or educational purposes; 
(C) disease or predation; 
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or 
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting a species’ continued ex-
istence.204 
The decision to list rests solely on biological grounds and must be made “without 
reference to possible economic or other impacts of [that] determination.”205 
Moreover, listing decisions must be made “solely on the basis of the best scientific 
and commercial data available.”206 The requirement to use the best available data is 
not tantamount to a command to seek and apply “the best . . . possible” data.207 
Rather, this requirement prevents the Services from disregarding evidence that is 
better than the scientific basis on which the Services do base their listing decisions.208 
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Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 106 (D.D.C. 
2011), aff’d, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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2. Critical Habitat 
After listing a species as endangered or threatened, the Services must also desig-
nate critical habitat “to the maximum extent prudent and determinable.”209 Critical 
habitat includes areas containing “physical or biological features” that are “essential 
to the conservation of the species and [] which may require special management con-
siderations or protection.”210 
Critical habitat may also include areas outside a species’ current range if such 
habitat is essential to the conservation of that species.211 Although the designation of 
critical habitat must “tak[e] into consideration the economic impact” of designating 
any particular area, the Services may not deny the critical habitat designation to any 
area where the “best scientific and commercial data available” indicate that “the fail-
ure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the spe-
cies.”212 
Because the Act aspires not merely to “halt” but also to “reverse the trend 
towards” biodiversity loss,213 the Act directs the Services to develop a recovery plan 
aimed at improving the status of each listed species so that listing is no longer nec-
essary.214 A recovery plan must identify “management actions necessary . . . for the 
conservation and survival of the species,” to the point of either “recommend[ing] 
corrective action” or explaining why such action “is impracticable or unneces-
sary.”215 Although a recovery plan need not specify a precise timetable, it must in-
clude estimates for the time needed to perform recovery measures.216 The ultimate 
factors for delisting a species are the same as those that inform the decision to list a 
species as endangered or threatened.217 
3. Interagency Consultation  
Section 7 of the Act requires each federal agency to ensure that its actions are “not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened 
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat.”218 
The jeopardy prong of section 7 addresses the impact of agency action on the survival 
and recovery of a listed species.219 By contrast, the adverse modification prong con-
cerns critical habitat.220 A determination that proposed agency action “may affect” a 
                                                                                                             
 
 209. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
 210. Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i). 
 211. Id. § 1532(5)(A)(ii). 
 212. Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
 213. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). 
 214. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f); 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d)(2) (2016). 
 215. Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 108 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 216. See Defs. of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp. 2d 121, 134 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 217. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202 (D. Colo. 2011); Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 111. 
 218. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); accord Hill, 437 U.S. at 183–84. 
 219. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 220. See id.  
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listed species or its critical habitat triggers the obligation to formally consult the FWS 
or NMFS, as appropriate.221 
Formal consultation under section 7 typically results in the issuance of a biologi-
cal opinion evaluating jeopardy to a listed species’ continued existence and adverse 
modification of its habitat.222 At the very least, where a biological opinion has found 
that proposed federal action will directly affect a listed species for reasons independ-
ent of climate change, that biological opinion must also address the cumulative ef-
fects of climate change.223 
The obligation to examine climate change in biological opinions that have already 
found direct, non-climate-related impacts on a listed species resembles an existing 
strategy for regulating greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. The EPA 
has invoked its so-called “anyway” authority to require the installation of the best 
available control technology for greenhouse gases at facilities whose emissions of 
conventional pollutants would subject them to the EPA’s permitting authority under 
Title V and/or the Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions of the Clean Air 
Act.224 
It is not statutory language, but administrative practice and judicial review, that 
have infused the Endangered Species Act with the power to address climate change. 
The text of the Act does not obligate the Services, in their discharge of their obliga-
tions under sections 4 and 7, to consider the impact of climate change.225 Nor does 
the Act require that the Services account for climate change in their critical habitat 
designation decisions.226 The proclamation that the Act contains “no statutory re-
quirement” compelling the Services “to discuss climate change in [their] listing de-
cisions”227 echoes judicial sentiments expressed a generation earlier. In the 1990s, 
federal courts had opined that conservation biology—a diverse science whose con-
cerns span “population dynamics, species turnover, patch size, recolonization prob-
lems, fragmentation problems, edge effects, and island biogeography”—need not 
guide federal administrative decision making.228 
More recent judicial decisions have breathed new power into the Endangered 
Species Act as a legal tool for addressing the effects of climate change. In 2011, the 
                                                                                                             
 
 221. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (2016); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158 (1997). 
 222. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. 
 223. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 
F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1184 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 
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 224. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2447–49 (2014). 
 225. See Colo. River Cutthroat Trout v. Salazar, 898 F. Supp. 2d 191, 206–07 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 226. See All. for the Wild Rockies v. Lyder, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1140 (D. Mont. 2010). 
 227. Colo. River Cutthroat Trout, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 207; see also Interagency Cooperation 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,868, 47,872 (Aug. 15, 2008) (opining that 
federal agencies face “no requirement to consult” the NMFS or FWS “on greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions’ contribution to global warming and its associated impacts on listed spe-
cies”). 
 228. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 618–20 (7th Cir. 1995); see also id. at 623 (de-
clining to transform even valid “general theor[ies]” of science “into a management tool unless 
[an agency] can apply it to a concrete situation”); Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 
96, 106 (D.D.C. 1995) (declining to endorse specific techniques for managing “distinct geo-
graphic ecosystems . . . inhabited by grizzly bears”). 
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Ninth Circuit invalidated the Fish and Wildlife Service’s attempt to delist 
Yellowstone grizzly bears as a threatened species, on the grounds that the Service 
had failed to properly account for the impact of climate change on the whitebark 
pine, a primary source of food for grizzlies.229 The climate-driven loss of whitebark 
pine trees could foreseeably increase conflicts between bears and humans and 
thereby harm the bears’ prospects for reproductive success and overall survival.230 
Thanks to its breadth, section 7’s requirement that federal agencies must consult 
the FWS or NMFS if proposed action “may affect” a listed species or its critical 
habitat has the potential to cover “any action that results in non-trivial net increases” 
in greenhouse gases.231 As between administrative discretion and judicial review, 
more aggressive enforcement of the Endangered Species Act by the Services will 
have greater impact on efforts to mitigate climate change. Because reviewing courts 
are admonished “not to substitute [their] judgment for that of [an] agency,”232 espe-
cially where disputed matters involve “a high level of technical expertise”233 or lie 
near “the frontiers of science,”234 courts will hesitate to reverse agency action on the 
basis of challenges “amount[ing] to nothing more than competing views about policy 
and science.”235 
B. Habitat Conservation on Private Lands 
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act provides: “it is unlawful for any person 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to . . . take any [endangered] species 
within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States [or] take any such 
species upon the high seas.”236 Section 9’s prohibition against the taking of 
                                                                                                             
 
 229. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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(9th Cir. 1999); Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1124 
(D. Or. 2011).  
 233. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989). 
 234. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); Forest 
Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003); accord Lands Council v. 
McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 235. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig., 709 F.3d 
1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) 
Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d. 65, 69 (D.D.C. 2011)). 
 236. See ESA § 9(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2012). 
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endangered species dramatically expands the scope of the Act from agencies of the 
federal government to all actors, including the entire private sector. 
Notably, the Act does not directly prohibit the taking of a threatened species. 
Section 9, however, does punish the “violat[ion of] any regulation pertaining . . . to 
any threatened species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to” section 4 of the Act.237 
By regulation, the Services have defined the taking of a threatened species as a vio-
lation of section 9.238 Prophylactic protection of threatened species alongside more 
immediately endangered species supports “preventive measures before a species is 
‘conclusively’ headed for extinction.”239  
The Act’s definition of “take” and its administrative interpretation are the true 
source of legal power in section 9’s prohibition against the taking of endangered 
species. The Act defines “take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect” a member of an endangered species.240 In turn, regula-
tions issued by the Services have defined the term “harm” as including “significant 
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by sig-
nificantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or 
sheltering.”241 
The celebrated 1995 Supreme Court case of Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon242 upheld, as a “reasonable” exercise in statutory 
interpretation and implementation, the application of these expanded definitions of 
“take” and “harm” to the destruction or significant modification of critical habitat 
adversely affecting an endangered or threatened species, even without a demonstra-
tion of intent to injure any individual specimen.243 If only incidentally, Sweet Home 
also left intact the Department of the Interior’s application of its habitat destruction 
rule to threatened species.244 
As a statutory and administrative law landmark, Sweet Home is regarded either as 
an intractably difficult battle over interpretive canons245 or as a relatively easy case 
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 241. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
 242. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 243. See id. at 699–700; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (authorizing the designation of 
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 244. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 692 n.5 (observing how the parties challenging the habitat 
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§ 17.31(a)). 
 245. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a 
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that the Supreme Court converted into a pitched ideological battle over environmen-
tal and regulatory values.246 As a substantive exercise in environmental law, Sweet 
Home vindicated the promise that the Endangered Species Act had exhibited since 
the Supreme Court’s first decision interpreting that statute. In 1973, shortly after the 
passage of the Act, the Justices immediately displayed their understanding of the 
potential of habitat destruction to disrupt breeding and eliminate indispensable food 
sources:  
[T]he snail darter occurs only in the swifter portions of shoals over clean 
gravel substrate in cool, low-turbidity water. Food of the snail darter is 
almost exclusively snails which require a clean gravel substrate for their 
survival. The proposed impoundment of water behind the proposed 
Tellico Dam would result in total destruction of the snail darter’s habi-
tat.247  
The failure of CITES to protect orchids demonstrates that similar sophistication has 
not migrated from American law to the international sphere.248 
The use of section 9 against habitat destruction triggers other provisions of the 
Endangered Species Act. Section 10 authorizes incidental take permits upon submis-
sion and approval of a habitat conservation plan (HCP).249 In turn, approval of an 
HCP triggers the federal government’s obligation under section 7 to “insure that any 
action” it undertakes “is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse mod-
ification” of critical habitat.250 Section 4(d) of the Act, which authorizes “necessary 
and advisable” protective regulations favoring threatened species,251 may also be used 
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to establish the functional equivalent of HCPs for threatened species.252 These provi-
sions have been interpreted as imposing an affirmative obligation to pursue an active 
species conservation policy.253 
Before HCPs became a familiar fixture of Endangered Species Act enforcement, 
developers and farmers facing section 9 liability often resorted to “the ‘scorched 
earth’ technique” of preemptively clearing wildlife habitat.254 Debates over the sup-
posed inflexibility of section 9 can be resolved, at least in part, by examining the 
actual record of responses to ESA enforcement.255 The rates at which landowners 
“shoot, shovel, and shut up”256 can be tracked, for instance, by measuring whether 
harvesting rates in southeastern pine forests vary according to the presence of the 
federally protected red-cockaded woodpecker.257 In upholding the listing of the 
northern spotted owl as an endangered species and the designation of its critical habitat, 
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the economic impact of these decisions and the poten-
tial for landowners to undermine the federal government’s efforts to protect that spe-
cies.258 
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Moreover, political pressure routinely pushes Congress to cripple the listing of 
endangered and threatened species under section 4.259 The political economy of bio-
diversity conservation enables opponents of species protection to disrupt listing de-
cisions.260 Though extinctions proceed apace, Congress has been known to impose a 
moratorium on the expansion of the endangered species list,261 only to suspend such 
moratoria when political winds shift.262 
Beginning with efforts to reconcile preservation of the remaining habitat of the 
endangered Mission Blue butterfly with commercial development on San Bruno 
Mountain on the San Francisco peninsula,263 ESA enforcement from the 1990s on-
ward transformed “the previously obscure and rarely used permit provision” of sec-
tion 10 into “the centerpiece of endangered species and ecosystem conservation pol-
icy.”264 Threatened section 9 liability became merely the “opening gambit[] in a 
prolonged bargaining process.”265 HCPs today represent “perhaps the most visible 
example of a consensus-based, multi-stakeholder approach to resource manage-
ment.”266 Section 10 enforcement has transformed section 9’s nominally invariant 
rule into a “penalty default,” a legal baseline intentionally designed to be sufficiently 
unpleasant to spur affected parties into negotiating more favorable alternatives.267 
The strategy has its limits. Like the Endangered Species Act as a whole, HCPs 
proceed species by species, and only after an individual species has begun to decline. 
                                                                                                             
 
 259. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2012) (authorizing the listing of endangered 
species). 
 260. See Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting To Be Protected Under the Endangered Species 
Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & ECON. 29 (1999). 
 261. See Pub. L. No. 104-6, § 117, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995). 
 262. See Memorandum of April 26, 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,667 (May 16, 1996); see also 
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t 
Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997); Jason M. Patlis, Riders on the Storm, or 
Navigating the Crosswinds of Appropriations and Administration of the Endangered Species 
Act: A Play in Five Acts, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 257 (2003). 
 263. See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 982–83 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
 264. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty 
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 970 (2003); see also S. REP. 
NO. 97-418, at 10 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 31–32 (1982); MICHAEL J. BEAN, SARAH G. 
FITZGERALD & MICHAEL A. O’CONNELL, RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING EXPERIENCE 52–55 (1991); Jamie A. 
Grodsky, The Paradox of (Eco)Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1037, 1058–59, 1058 n.81 (2003); 
Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for 
Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 375–76 (1996). 
 265. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance 
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 317 (1999). For further discussion of en-
vironmental law as a process of public-sector negotiation, see David A. Dana, The New 
“Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35. 
 266. Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 194 (2000). 
 267. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: 
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 825 (1992); Stephen J. Ware, 
Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
703, 706 (1999). 
340 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93:303 
 
Despite well-founded doubts about the territorial and institutional suitability of states 
as participants in ecosystem management,268 state-law restrictions on land use can 
enhance the effectiveness of federal HCPs.269 California law facilitates natural com-
munity conservation plans that provide “large-scale, multi-species equivalents of 
HCPs.”270 That state’s active intervention is crucial because it is home to the 
California floristic province, the hottest of biological “hotspots” in the continental 
United States.271 
Ultimately, however, the Endangered Species Act only indirectly addresses habi-
tat loss and altogether ignores “other causes” of biodiversity loss “such as the inva-
sion of exotic species and air and water pollution.”272 The Act as a whole falls far 
short of “promot[ing] the conservation of ecosystems on the geographic scale neces-
sary to promote biodiversity generally.”273 
C. Αρκτούρος: Climate Change in the “Last Great Wilderness” 
Though the frigid polar regions may be poor in biodiversity, they exhibit some of 
the most dramatic effects of global warming. Climatic impacts on Arctic Ocean sea 
ice are among the most alarming harbingers of rising temperatures worldwide.274 In 
the United States alone, many legal tools are emerging as instruments of climate 
change policymaking. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 
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SYSTEMATICS 347 (2014); Ryan Calsbeek, John N. Thompson & James E. Richardson, Patterns 
of Molecular Evolution and Diversification in a Biodiversity Hotspot: The California Floristic 
Province, 12 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 1021 (2003). 
 272. Tarlock, supra note 154, at 10,537. See generally, e.g., Elaine K. Harding et al., The 
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CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 488 (2000) (evaluating the use of scientific data in HCPs). 
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not only the authority but also the obligation under the Clean Air Act to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.275 The Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act276 and the National Environmental Policy Act277 require the 
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration to address carbon emissions 
through corporate average fuel efficiency (CAFE) standards, or at least to explain 
why the agency has declined to adopt more stringent CAFE standards.278 
For some time, the law has contemplated the possibility that human agents of cli-
mate change might bear tort liability.279 Alaskan native villages have failed in their 
efforts to recover damages for climate change induced damage to human habitat. In 
rejecting the village of Kivalina’s suit against ExxonMobil, a federal court described 
“the harm from global warming” as a causally remote “series of events disconnected 
from the discharge” of “greenhouse gases,” which must then “combine with other gases 
in the atmosphere which in turn results in the planet retaining heat, which in turn causes 
the ice caps to melt and the oceans to rise, which in turn causes the Arctic sea ice to 
melt, which in turn allegedly renders Kivalina vulnerable to erosion and deterioration 
resulting from winter storms.”280 
Another court has rejected a native village’s claim against the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management for alleged harm arising from an Arctic Ocean oil exploration 
plan.281 Consistent with older precedent holding that the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972 displaced federal common law claims arising from 
a sewage discharge,282 the Supreme Court has invoked the Clean Air Act to repel 
federal common law claims against greenhouse gas emissions.283 
Against this admittedly modest baseline, the Endangered Species Act has 
achieved remarkable success in addressing the seemingly relentless emission of 
greenhouse gases and the anthropogenic contribution to climate change. The appli-
cation of the Act to species most immediately menaced by climate change offers a 
promising set of remedies. With a reach that exceeds that of sections 4 and 7, section 
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seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants”). 
342 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93:303 
 
9 of the Act may yet be construed to treat greenhouse gas emissions as a legally 
critical link in a causal chain leading to the unlawful “taking” of an endangered spe-
cies.284 
The application of section 9 to climate change would represent a significant step 
beyond Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon.285 Her opinion emphasized limitations imposed 
“by ordinary principles of proximate causation,” including embedded “notions of 
foreseeability,”286 in order to curb the perceived excesses of the Ninth Circuit’s 1988 
Palila decision.287 In 1995 Justice O’Connor questioned whether section 9 could be 
lawfully construed to reach destruction of the palila bird’s habitat in Hawaii through 
sheep-grazing.288  The question today is whether section 9 may be applied to signif-
icant modification or degradation of habitat traceable to anthropogenic climate 
change.289 
Climate change has figured prominently in both listing and critical habitat desig-
nation decisions for species ranging from subtropical elkhorn and staghorn coral290 
to sage grouse and wolverine on the North American mainland291 and bearded and 
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ringed seals in northern seas.292 The FWS has designated the Pacific walrus as a can-
didate for threatened status, but has not yet listed that species.293 The record of 
Endangered Species Act cases addressing climate change upholds the longstanding 
legal preference for large, charismatic fauna over all other forms of biodiversity.294 
The signature battle over the application of the Act to climate change has in-
volved, quite unsurprisingly, the polar bear.295 Litigation has swamped all aspects of 
the FWS’s efforts to protect the polar bear, from its listing as a threatened species296 
to the designation of large portions of the Arctic as critical habitat297 and the appli-
cation of section 9’s prohibition against takings of polar bears.298 
The English word “Arctic,” after all, stems from ἄρκτος, the ancient Greek word 
for “bear,” in honor of the constellation that other ancient people called Ursa 
Major.299 Arcturus (Ἀρκτοῦρος), the celebrated northern star, means the “guardian of 
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the bear.”300 Other ancient sources have drawn inspiration from these northern aster-
isms: “He is wise in heart, and mighty in strength,” “[w]hich maketh Arcturus, Orion, 
and Pleiades, and the chambers of the south.”301 The existential threat to the polar 
bear has spurred legal action against the vectors of anthropogenically induced cli-
mate change. 
In 2008 the FWS listed the polar bear as threatened by the effects of climate 
change on the bear’s Arctic habitat.302 Although the FWS initially declined to desig-
nate critical habitat for the polar bear, it dramatically reversed course in 2010 by 
designating 187,157 square miles in Alaska and adjacent waters of the United States 
and its territories303: 
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 Of central importance to the listing of the polar bear and to the designation of its 
habitat as critical is the existential threat that climate change poses to Arctic sea 
ice.304 The D.C. Circuit quoted the portion of the listing decision which recognized 
that irreversible “changes to the polar bear’s habitat will soon pose an existential 
threat to the species”:305 
Productivity, abundance, and availability of ice seals, the polar bear’s 
primary prey base, would be diminished by the projected loss of sea 
ice, and energetic requirements of polar bears for movement and ob-
taining food would increase. Access to traditional denning areas would 
be affected. In turn, these factors would cause declines in the condition 
of polar bears from nutritional stress and reduced productivity. As al-
ready evidenced in the Western Hudson Bay and Southern Beaufort 
Sea populations, polar bears would experience reductions in survival 
and recruitment rates. The eventual effect is that polar bear populations 
would decline. The rate and magnitude of decline would vary among 
populations, based on differences in the rate, timing, and magnitude of 
impacts. However, within the foreseeable future, all populations would 
be affected, and the species is likely to become in danger of extinction 
throughout all of its range due to declining sea ice habitat.306 
The parallel with TVA v. Hill’s recognition of the Tellico Dam’s existential threat to 
the snail darter is impossible to miss.307 
The impact of climate change on the Arctic is hardly limited to polar bears. Even 
the color of ice itself contributes to a significant albedo effect:308 as ice melts, the 
darkening of the sea or land surface absorbs more solar energy and accelerates global 
warming even more.309 Albedo has sufficient climatic impact to warrant serious 
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consideration of geoengineering projects designed to alter the color of the earth,310 
even to the point of turning the daytime sky from blue to white.311 
Federal courts have upheld most aspects of the FWS’s polar bear decisions.312 
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska did invalidate the FWS’s 
designation of Unit 2, a stretch of northern Alaska spanning the Canadian border 
and the town of Barrow, because the FWS used its finding of a need to isolate polar 
bear dens from humans and human activities, an “essential feature” of Unit 2 that 
constituted only “approximately one percent of the entire area,” as an improper 
basis for “designat[ing] a large swath of land . . . as ‘critical habitat.’”313 
For its part, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has 
rejected a challenge to the FWS’s decision to confine the protection of polar bears 
under section 9 of the Act according to exemptions granted by the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act314 and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Flora and Fauna315 and to refrain from enforcing section 9 with respect to 
activities outside the polar bears’ range, notwithstanding those activities’ inci-
dental impact on polar bears.316 Using its authority under the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act,317 the FWS has routinely authorized nonlethal, incidental takings 
of polar bears and Pacific walruses.318 The authority to permit incidental takings 
requires the Service to determine that such takings will have no more than a 
“negligible impact” on the affected population.319 In applying its incidental takings 
authority, the Service must analyze “reasonably expected” and “reasonably likely” 
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effects leading to a “negligible impact,” but bears no obligation to consider specu-
lative or uncertain effects.320  
The brief legal record of applying the Endangered Species Act to climate change 
has already shifted the policy-making terrain. Designation of the polar bear’s crit-
ical habitat recognizes the ecological threat that climate change poses to the bio-
sphere. The Arctic has been justifiably described as “the last great wilderness.”321 
Wilderness areas have long offered the promise of providing refuges “where the 
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a 
visitor who does not remain.”322 
Despite their low levels of biodiversity, the Arctic and other cold and/or high-
elevation locales may yet prove to be pivotal legal battlegrounds in the last-ditch 
effort to save the earth and its diverse forms of life from anthropogenically induced 
climate change. Although the law offers no conclusive answer to the question of 
whether the Endangered Species Act “is an effective or appropriate tool to address 
the threat of climate change,”323 climate change and biodiversity conservation re-
main the most important things that the law can address. 
IV. THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 
AND CLIMATE MITIGATION IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 
A. A New Epoch 
Remarkably, profound biodiversity loss and accelerating climate change represent 
“only the tip of the iceberg.”324 So deep is the human footprint on the global 
environment that some scientists have urged the redesignation of this moment in 
geological time as the Anthropocene epoch.325 From the initial domestication of plants 
and animals 11,000 to 9000 years ago,326 through the Industrial Revolution and the 
“Great Acceleration” of population, affluence, and technology since World War II,327 
                                                                                                             
 
 320. 50 C.F.R. § 18.27(c) (2016); accord Kempthorne, 588 F.3d at 710–11. 
 321. See ROGER KAYE, LAST GREAT WILDERNESS: THE CAMPAIGN TO ESTABLISH THE ARCTIC 
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (2006). 
 322. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). 
 323. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & 4(d) Rule Litig., 818 F. Supp. 2d 
214, 234 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 324. Will Steffen, Jacques Grinevald, Paul Crutzen & John McNeill, The Anthropocene: 
Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 842, 843 
(2011). 
 325. See Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind, 415 NATURE 23 (2002); Paul J. Crutzen & 
Eugene F. Stoermer, The “Anthropocene,” GLOBAL CHANGE NEWSL. (Stockholm), May 2000, at 
17; Editorial, The Human Epoch, 473 NATURE 254 (2011). 
 326. Bruce D. Smith & Melinda A. Zeder, The Onset of the Anthropocene, 4 ANTHROPOCENE 
8, 13 (2013). 
 327. See Kathy A. Hibbard, Paul J. Crutzan, Eric F. Lambin, Diana M. Liverman, Nathan J. 
Mantua, John R. McNeill, Bruno Messerli & Will Steffen, Group Report: Decadal-Scale 
Interactions of Humans and the Environment, in SUSTAINABILITY OR COLLAPSE? AN INTEGRATED 
HISTORY AND FUTURE OF PEOPLE ON EARTH 341 (Robert Costanza, Lisa J. Graumlich & Will 
Steffen eds., 2007). 
348 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93:303 
 
human activity has had a profound impact on every physical and biological aspect of 
the planet.328 
Strict notions of the human ecological footprint329 define environmental sustain-
ability according to the physical flows of energy and matter.330 By these benchmarks, 
humanity is gobbling the planet. Humans now consume 20–40% of the solar energy 
captured by plants.331 Humans co-opt approximately 40% of net primary production 
in terrestrial ecosystems and 25% of global net primary production, including 
photosynthesis in the oceans.332 Humanity currently claims 54% of Earth’s available 
fresh water, and that thirst is projected to increase to 70% by 2050.333 “[T]he world’s 
average human eco-footprint is about 2.3 [hectares, or 5.7 acres], even though there 
are only 1.9 [hectares, or 4.7 acres] of productive land and water per person on 
Earth.”334 
Even the mechanics of evolution have changed. Whereas island biogeography 
before humanity operated according to geographic area and isolation,335 the island 
biogeography of the Anthropocene is dominated by the economic isolation of human 
populations.336 Cuba, the largest land mass in the West Indies, has absorbed fewer 
losses of native anole lizards attributable to colonization by exotic anoles, almost 
entirely because trade sanctions have isolated the island’s human population.337 The  
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renormalization of economic relations between Cuba and the United States thus 
bodes ill for biodiversity in an ecologically sensitive region.338 Peace among na-
tions, alas, accelerates the anthropogenic vectors of biodiversity loss. In retrospect, 
Anthropocene revisions in island biogeography may explain weaknesses in the 
equilibrium theory underlying the traditional species-area relationship.339 
Beyond the specific context of island biogeography, humanity’s alteration of 
ecology to suit its own needs and tastes has triggered multiple regime shifts in 
terrestrial and aquatic environments.340 If complex adaptive ecosystems are to re-
gain their capacity to deliver services that humans prize, human institutions such 
as the law must work to sustain surviving ecosystems and to transform degraded 
ecosystems.341 Community-level responses to radical changes such as global 
warming and ocean acidification may affect different trophic levels of the ecolog-
ical pyramid, including simple organisms whose extinction could trigger the col-
lapse of entire ecosystems.342 Ecology, after all, involves the interaction of indi-
viduals, populations, and communities.343 There is no time to waste. Especially as 
measured by sensitive measures such as vertebrates,344 coral reefs,345 and tropical 
forests,346 the damage may be truly incommensurable. 
In the sweep of geological time, humanity itself is the mass extinction event. 
Through natural history, most mass extinction events have been attributed to 
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extraterrestrial causes,347 or at least abiotic factors such as mass volcanism348 or sea-
level change.349 Only twice before the present have life forms been blamed for in-
ducing a mass extinction. First, cyanobacteria converted the anoxic pre-Cambrian 
atmosphere by producing so much oxygen that they irrevocably poisoned the atmos-
phere for obligate anaerobes.350 Second, terrestrial plants may have triggered global 
cooling during the late Devonian period.351 We may be witnessing the first geological 
episode in nearly 400 million years—or perhaps even 2.2 billion years—in which the 
rampant success of one form of life has doomed many unrelated species. 
Geologic history offers humanity the thinnest glimmer of a future. Though “there 
is little positive to be said about extinction,” modest hope lies in the realization that 
“present-day extinctions have not yet achieved the intensities seen in the Big Five 
mass extinctions of the geologic past, which each removed ≥50% of the subset of 
relatively abundant marine invertebrate genera.”352 On the other hand, most “[o]f the  
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major and minor extinctions” of the past half billion years “are associated with global 
warming” and its negative effects, such as marine anoxia and ocean acidification.353 
“The atmosphere is the obvious linkage between” the marine and terrestrial “bio-
spheres, and . . . atmospheric drivers of extinction . . . may hold the key to catastro-
phes of global scale.”354 Whatever the proper antecedents in geological history, if 
any,355 we are “in the midst of one of the largest experiments in the history of the 
Earth.”356 
At an absolute minimum, humanity should combat biodiversity loss and climate 
change out of crass self-interest. As biodiversity destruction, climate change, and 
other catastrophes “propagat[e] . . . perturbations through one or more trophic levels 
in an ecosystem,” organisms seemingly remote from danger become, in fact, seri-
ously imperiled.357 In the killing fields of the Anthropocene, “[h]umans are among 
the most severely affected species.”358 Mortality is “the fatal flaw . . . which Nature, 
in one shape or another, stamps ineffaceably on all her productions, either to imply 
that they are temporary and finite, or that their [survival] must be wrought by toil and 
pain.”359 
Human domination of global ecosystems and their physical energy flows carries 
no inherent assurance that it will continue. Humanity’s “transient domination” nei-
ther arises from “intrinsic superiority” nor guarantees “extended survival.”360 
Panthalassa (πανθάλασσα—“universal sea”), which once designated the all-encom 
passing ocean that spanned the Permian extinction and the dawn of the Triassic,361 
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may describe a future earth whose ice caps have melted.362 “When the last of earth 
left to discover / Is that which was the beginning / . . . Not known, because not looked 
for / But heard, half-heard, in the stillness / Between two waves of the sea.”363 
On the geological time scales by which evolution and earth science operate, nearly 
all species become extinct. Of the “five to fifty billion species [that] have existed at 
one time or another,” roughly “one in a thousand” still exists—“a truly lousy survival 
record” based upon “99.9 percent failure.”364 Indeed, careful evaluation of the Raup-
Seposki “kill curve,” a histogram of biological extinctions over the 600 million years 
of multicellular life,365 “suggest[s] that there might be a maximum lifespan of about 
350 million[] years” for any species.366 In stark contrast with the vulgar and mislead-
ing depiction of evolution as “survival of the fittest,”367 “extinction through bad luck” 
represents a crucial “element [of] the evolutionary process.”368 Biologically speak-
ing, dominance today can dissolve into extinction tomorrow.369 “[T]he race is not to 
the swift, nor the battle to the strong . . . but time and chance happeneth to them 
all.”370 
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B. An Environmental Ethos Intended To Endure for Ages To Come 
Ecological and evolutionary science delivers a compelling case for legal interven-
tion. What these environmental crises need from law is twofold—not only the me-
chanical tools for addressing specific vectors of biodiversity loss and anthropogenic 
drivers of climate change, but also abiding commitments to environmental preserva-
tion and sustainable development within fundamental law. If the law would fulfill its 
environmental schemes, it must first inspire environmental dreams. The environmen-
tal philosophies underlying law today are at once both obsolete and insufficiently 
respectful of natural history and human tradition. “A sustainable world will require 
an ethic that is ultimately as incorporated into culture and as long lasting as a consti-
tutional bill of rights or as religious commandments.”371 
“For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture.”372 In con-
temporary secular society, fundamental legal charters represent “sacred symbol[s] of 
nationhood as well as . . . profane instrument[s] of government.”373 At the level of 
public international law, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development has 
proclaimed that “[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”374 Many 
nations around the world enshrine a similar commitment to sustainability in their 
constitutions.375  
Even more so than its constitutional counterpart, however, American environmen-
tal law prefers to play on its own turf.376 The mere fact that occasional citations to 
foreign law divide the Supreme Court377 suggests that the United States, at least in 
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the first instance, might draw environmental inspiration from its own laws. The 
Constitution “provide[s] the scripture of a national civil religion.”378 The preamble 
to the Constitution speaks of acts that are “sacred as well as secular in character and 
authority, for we know that ministers are ‘ordained’ and that churches as well as 
constitutions are ‘established.’”379 Constitutions, religious creeds, and rules of envi-
ronmental engagement adhere to at least one shared creed: they are all “intended to 
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs.”380 
Infusing American law with an environmental ethos is no trivial task. Despite its 
characterization as a “covenant running from” generation to generation,381 the 
Constitution of the United States makes no explicit pledge to protect the environ-
ment. American law nevertheless enjoys other means to secure special legal status 
for environmental protection.382 Enshrining a quasi-constitutional environmental 
ethos akin to Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic”383 or Arne Naess’s “deep ecology”384 re-
quires the less direct, but more creative, use of tools at the law’s disposal. 
The balance of this Article addresses four possibilities. First, judges and other 
decision makers could take more direct account of advances in environmental sci-
ence in wielding substantive tools directed at biodiversity loss and climate change. 
Second, NEPA may serve as a quasi-constitutional charter for environmental deci-
sion making. Third, even without concrete legal tools, policy makers may pursue 
more modest and pragmatic goals to protect biodiversity and mitigate climate 
change. Finally, failing all else, law should embrace appeals to the aesthetics and 
morality of environmental protection. 
C. Environmental Protection on the Last Promontory of the Centuries 
1. Revitalizing Environmental Law 
Parts II and III of this Article have shown how the law has failed to keep pace 
with scientific understandings of biodiversity loss and climate change. Effective en-
vironmental protection demands “learning strategies” that not only withstand a “high 
degree of uncertainty” but also absorb “our rapidly evolving understanding” of the 
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environmental sciences.385 Advances in the field of conservation biology have had 
little or no legal impact. Federal courts routinely decline to treat innovations in con-
servation biology as “a necessary element of diversity analysis.”386 
Illustrations of judicial failure abound. In a case assaulting the government’s fail-
ure to consider “population dynamics, species turnover, patch size, recolonization 
problems, fragmentation problems, edge effects, and island biogeography,”387 the 
Seventh Circuit ultimately held that these concepts of conservation biology were 
“uncertain in application” and that the Forest Service could therefore ignore them in 
managing national forests.388 Even a valid “general theory,” the court held, “does not 
translate into a management tool unless one can apply it to a concrete situation.”389 
A federal district court similarly declined to endorse specific techniques for man-
aging “distinct geographic ecosystems . . . inhabited by grizzly bears.”390 That court 
seemed to treat complexity as a legal excuse in its own right. The possibility that 
“science or circumstances could . . . change[],” the court reasoned, relieved the 
agency of any obligation to prepare an “exhaustively detailed recovery plan.”391 As 
a result, the court rejected a claim that the Endangered Species Act required “linkage 
zones” between ecosystems inhabited by grizzlies.392 
Cases of this nature suggest that conservation biology, until further notice, will 
not govern American environmental law until federal land management agencies and 
the Services, charged with implementing the Endangered Species Act, decide that it 
does. In the meanwhile, federal judges take frequent refuge in the maxim that “a 
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential” when an agency “is making 
predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science.”393 
Administrative and judicial passivity bode ill for biodiversity conservation. The fail-
ure to coordinate the law with scientific knowledge threatens to consign yet another 
environmental crisis requiring transnational cooperation to the perdition of zero-sum 
politics.394 
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At least in controversies involving climate change, federal courts have lost pa-
tience with expert agencies’ pleas that scientific uncertainty warrants further study 
before concrete action. As the Supreme Court noted in Massachusetts v. EPA,395 its 
landmark case on climate change, no agency can “avoid its statutory obligation” to 
enforce federal environmental law “by noting the uncertainty surrounding various 
features of climate change and concluding that it would therefore be better not to 
regulate at this time.”396 Because the relevant “statutory question is whether suffi-
cient information exists to make an endangerment finding,” and not whether the 
agency “would prefer not to regulate greenhouse gases because of some residual un-
certainty,” an agency wishing to defer “a reasoned judgment as to whether green-
house gases contribute to global warming” must explicitly declare that “the scientific 
uncertainty is so profound” as to paralyze the agency as a matter of law.397 
By the same token, an agency that does proceed despite uncertainty will find am-
ple judicial deference, especially where its statutory authority “is ‘precautionary in 
nature’ and ‘designed to protect the public health,’ and the relevant evidence is ‘dif-
ficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific 
knowledge.’”398 Reviewing courts remain painfully aware that they lack the “training 
[and] experience” that a “chemist, biologist or statistician” might apply to a contro-
versy involving biodiversity and climate change.399 The law often hesitates to apply 
science even though law itself constitutes “a formalized system for gathering and 
evaluating information about the world” through “observation, communication, in-
formed criticism, and response.”400 
Our legal culture, alas, remains a domain whose leaders shamelessly proclaim 
their ignorance of the “fine details of molecular biology.”401 Courts run a dire risk of 
falling behind “the extraordinary rate of scientific and other technological advances 
that figure increasingly in litigation” and, for that matter, in daily life.402 American 
                                                                                                             
 
Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 7 ENVTL. POL., no. 2, 1998, at 153; 
Peter Newell & Matthew Paterson, A Climate for Business: Global Warming, the State and 
Capital, 5 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 679 (1998). 
 395. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 396. Id. at 534. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 399. Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 36. 
 400. Doremus, supra note 262, at 1057; see also id. (“Substantively, science is the body of 
knowledge produced by this process.”). 
 401. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I join the judgment of the Court, 
and all of its opinion except Part I–A and some portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine 
details of molecular biology. I am unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or even 
my own belief.”); cf. Lisa Milot, Illuminating Innumeracy, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 769 
(2013) (acknowledging the “open secret that lawyers” (stereo)typically “don’t like math”). See 
generally James Ming Chen, Legal Quanta: A Mathematical Romance of Many Dimensions, 
2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 313 (2016). 
 402. Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.). 
2018] THE FRAGILE MENAGERIE  357 
 
law labors under an “extraordinary condition . . . which makes it possible for [some-
one] without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon” sci-
entifically or technologically sophisticated questions.403 
More than most other areas of legal endeavor, environmental law “involves policy 
determinations in which the agency is acknowledged to have expertise.”404 After all, 
the “principal purpose” of limitations of judicial review is “to avoid judicial entan-
glement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack both expertise and infor-
mation to resolve.”405 But review of administrative decisions routinely requires 
judges to “acquire the learning pertinent to complex technical questions in such fields 
as economics, science, technology and psychology.”406 Judges “should not automat-
ically succumb” to the “acknowledged expertise” of the agencies they review, “over-
whelmed as it were by the utter ‘scientificity’” of the regulatory process.407 
“Restraint, yes, abdication, no.”408 
2. NEPA As an Environmental Charter  
Alongside the Endangered Species Act,409 the National Environmental Policy 
Act410 heads the list of environmental “super-statutes” whose “normative [and] insti-
tutional” impact approaches that of the Constitution itself.411 When passed, these 
statutes heralded a revolutionary cycle of federal environmental statutes.412 
Despite their faults, NEPA and the Endangered Species Act outperform constitu-
tional law in protecting the interests of future generations.413 NEPA expressly de-
clares the federal government’s “continuing policy . . . [to] fulfill the social, eco-
nomic, and other requirements of present and future generations.”414 Furthermore, it  
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describes “the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for 
succeeding generations.”415 NEPA thus represents the American expression of a prin-
ciple that many other nations proclaim (and protect) through constitutional law.416 
No system of environmental ethics can command normative respect unless it pre-
serves the interests of future generations.417 
Severe limitations hamper NEPA’s power as an environmental charter. The 
Supreme Court has barred the use of NEPA to review agency decisions on the merits. 
“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary 
process.”418 Indeed, a crippled NEPA has come to exemplify “soft look” review in 
administrative law.419 The Court’s admonitions that federal agencies should take a 
nominally “hard look” at the environmental consequences of their decisions420 in 
practice “mandat[e]” little “more than the physical act of passing certain folders and 
papers [among] . . . reviewing officials” and thereby threaten to “make a mockery of 
the Act.”421 
Although NEPA is best known as a source of “procedural requirements . . . anal-
ogous” to those of the Endangered Species Act,422 one of its critical provisions does 
establish an interpretive principle that could be treated as a substantive “green” 
canon. “Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . the  
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policies, regulations and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and 
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in” NEPA.423 This language 
unambiguously requires the environmental laws of the United States to be interpreted 
and implemented so that they address all significant environmental risks, for the ben-
efit of future generations as well as today’s citizenry.424 
If this provision of NEPA has any meaning, legal ambiguities should be resolved 
in favor of the environment, even when—and perhaps especially when—competing 
economic interests might support a different answer. This sort of substantive canon 
resembles the very familiar canon urging the interpretation of statutes so as not to 
raise doubts over the constitutionality of acts of Congress.425 That interpretive canon 
in practice is a species of constitutional lawmaking.426 NEPA’s “green” canon has 
similar potential to serve as a significant source of substantive environmental princi-
ples. 
Akin to section 7 of the Endangered Species Act,427 NEPA frames the process by 
which the federal government considers the environmental impact of its major deci-
sions. NEPA directs the federal government to consider not only the “relationship 
between local short-term uses of [the] environment and the maintenance and en-
hancement of long-term productivity,” but also any “irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources.”428 Environmental impact statements prepared under 
NEPA must consider “ecological” effects—namely, “effects on natural resources and 
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on the components, structures, and functioning of . . . ecosystems” affected by major 
federal action.429 
Perhaps NEPA’s greatest accomplishment is its establishment of the principle that 
the federal government take no major action without first assessing the environmen-
tal impact of its decisions.430 Today’s international efforts to assess biodiversity, cli-
mate change, and other global environmental phenomena—perhaps the most vital 
scientific tools in humanity’s struggle to forestall biological disaster431—have a pre-
decessor in one of America’s foundational environmental statutes. 
3. Pragmatic Modesty 
 Even in the absence of aggressive legal intervention, “[t]hose of us who love 
nature, and who would like to ensure that nature persists for future generations to 
love, need to think about saving ordinary places and ordinary things.”432 Without 
abandoning the admittedly implausible prospect of comprehensively reconfiguring 
domestic and international environmental law to address climate change, habitat de-
struction, and alien invasive species, advocates of biodiversity conservation can pur-
sue a more modest reform agenda. 
First, international policymakers should develop a joint framework for the regu-
lation of commercial bioprospecting. This idea may build upon two models in inter-
national environmental law. First, a bioprospecting annex to the existing Convention 
on Biological Diversity may aspire to the success of the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer.433 Routinely hailed as one of the most 
successful charters of international environmental law, the Montreal Protocol now 
contributes to the reduction of two greenhouse gases, hydrofluorocarbons and per-
fluorocarbons.434 Second, given the general flow of commercially significant geno-
types from the developing world to wealthier countries, the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal435 
—which addresses traffic in hazardous wastes in the opposite direction, from rich 
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countries to their developing counterparts—may provide useful guidance on the 
unavoidable, underlying questions of environmental justice.436 
International coordination on commercial exploitation of biodiversity can im-
prove the very process of collecting rare specimens. If even casual hiking affects the 
distribution and population of wildlife,437 purposeful bioprospecting leaves a dramat-
ically deeper footprint. Bioprospectors, anthropologists, or journalists may even en-
gage in deliberate misconduct.438 Even though the collapse of global fisheries has 
shaken public confidence in official efforts to achieve “sustainability,”439 bitter ex-
perience teaches that the lack of coordination would be worse. The slash-and-collect 
approach of Victorian orchid harvesters would probably prevail.440 Rationalized har-
vesting would limit instances of “the wonderfully unusual accomplishment of dis-
covering and eradicating in the same instant a new species.”441 
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In addition, the international community should facilitate the professionalization 
of parataxonomy,442 especially in the developing world. Millions of species await 
collection and classification by properly trained field biologists. Transnational coop-
eration can help translate ethnobiological knowledge into terms understood by the 
global scientific community. Translational science provides a social bridge between 
formally trained biologists and the populations closest to critically endangered, bio-
diverse habitats.443 
Whatever the merits vel non of bioprospecting as a developmental strategy, the 
case for “codifying” traditional knowledge of all types is compelling.444 No less than 
in the law of patents and other branches of intellectual property law, the ultimate 
legal goal with respect to traditional knowledge should be the preservation, transmis-
sion, and encouragement of human ingenuity.445 Just as the enablement requirement 
ensures that a patent teaches practitioners of ordinary skill to duplicate an inven-
tion,446 codification of traditional knowledge reflects the “ultimate goal” of patent 
law in more economically and legally complex societies: that of “bring[ing] new de-
signs and technology into the public domain through disclosure.”447  
The economic impact of such scientific cooperation is simple, great, and immedi-
ate. “Scientific research,” to put it bluntly, “generates jobs.”448 The science of sys-
tematics is so labor intensive that the task of classifying 10 million species would 
require 25,000 professional lifetimes.449 Whether framed as cooperative bioprospect-
ing or north-to-south technology transfer for the enrichment of parataxonomy, com-
mercially oriented initiatives satisfy the Convention on Biological Diversity’s exhor-
tation that the international community should adopt “economically and socially 
sound measures . . . as incentives” to conserve biodiversity and to contribute to its 
sustainable development.450 Integrating rural populations into scientific and commer-
cial activities surrounding biodiversity conservation reflects the reality that “over a 
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billion rural people,” many of them abjectly poor, “are dependent for some part of 
their livelihood on the use and trade of wild resources.”451 
The willingness to pursue a more modest agenda, however, does not weaken the 
need for more aggressive conservation measures. In situ preservation remains the 
only effective way to save biodiversity. Consistent with the precepts of island bioge-
ography, the larger the tract of land set aside for conservation, the better.452 Zoos, 
gene banks, and other ex situ strategies fall far short of the mark.453 Despite consum-
ing a significant portion of the capital expended on conservation, ex situ efforts have 
protected a trivial amount of biodiversity.454 Ex situ conservation cannot preserve the 
adaptive and evolutionary value of individual species, let alone entire ecosystems.455 
Moreover, by introducing criteria designed to suit human tastes and preferences, 
ex situ preservation exerts selective pressure on those species that are targeted for 
protection.456 Only in situ conservation can effectively preserve the “conditions 
where genetic resources exist with ecosystems and natural habitats,” or at least the 
surroundings where “domesticated or cultivated species . . . have developed their 
distinctive properties.”457 Finding viable biomes, especially those that have no his-
torical or current equivalent, for those imperiled species that might flourish in the 
ecosystems of the future will assume utmost urgency.458 
Finally, the academic community bears a singularly immense responsibility to 
educate the public. America’s wealth belies a crippling lack of political will and sci-
entific sophistication. A country whose citizens lead the developed world in rejecting 
evolutionary biology459 is ill equipped to reorient the primary focus of biodiversity 
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conservation from preventing overkill to preserving habitat and slowing the influx of 
alien species. 
Law, along with economics and other social sciences within the “third culture” 
that bridges science and the humanities in modern society, has a unique opportunity 
(and obligation) to address and ameliorate the conditions under which “human beings 
are living or have lived.”460 American legal culture, after all, has made it possible for 
at least one member of the highest court in the land to condemn habitat preservation 
because it allegedly “imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon 
the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zo-
ological use.”461 That same jurist has even derived perverse pleasure from mocking 
“the much beloved secular legend of the Monkey Trial.”462 Rhetorical stunts of this 
sort deliver succor to the enemies of biological enlightenment.463 
4. For Nowadays the World Is Lit by Lightning  
In environmental protection as in “welfare economics,” all “problems . . . must 
ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals.”464 Human civilization has 
changed the world beyond recovery within any timeframe capable of being contem-
plated, let alone managed, by our species. The project of ameliorating humanity’s 
environmental footprint demands humility, wonder, and above all a thorough scien-
tific understanding of natural history and our species’ contingent, evanescent, and 
fragile place in it. The law’s approach to environmental ethics, as simple as it is ob-
vious, should approach all efforts “to preserve an ecosystem and its component spe-
cies . . . as if each species is sacred.”465 
Whether by design or by happenstance, however, civilization has trodden a dif-
ferent path. Much of environmental law’s internal ethos of conservation and con-
sumption reflects the aesthetic and political philosophy expressed by the early twen-
tieth century’s Futurist movement.466 “[T]he world has been enriched with a new 
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beauty,” proclaimed The Futurist Manifesto in 1909, “the beauty of speed.”467 
Contemporary industrialized societies have affirmatively embraced “[s]peed [as] the 
form of ecstasy the technical revolution has bestowed on man.”468 
Having catapulted itself to global ecological dominance through its Great 
Acceleration,469 human society must now pay a profound, perhaps unbearable, price. 
“A law of acceleration, definite and constant as any law of mechanics, cannot be 
supposed to relax its energy to suit the convenience of man.”470 Contemporary life 
having embraced the Futurists’ “love of danger” and their “habit of energy and of 
temerity,” we shall “like young lions . . . r[u]n after Death, its dark pelt blotched with 
pale crosses as it escape[s] down the vast violet living and throbbing sky.”471 
Humanity’s contribution to the acceleration of natural history has triggered a correl-
ative, awful responsibility: that of managing “eternal, omnipresent speed” on “the 
last promontory of the centuries.”472 
Framing biodiversity loss and climate change as environmental issues operating 
on a geological clock reverses the preference for speed expressed in the accelerated 
timetables of politics and technology. “Ah, where have they gone, the amblers of 
yesteryear? Where have they gone, those loafing heroes of folk song, those vaga-
bonds who roam from one mill to another and bed down under the stars?”473 Only by 
tracing “feeling and myth . . . back through time past cultural history to the evolu-
tionary origins of human nature”474 can we recover the magic that bewitched human-
ity when first it beheld “[e]very contour of the terrain [and] every plant and animal 
living in it.”475 To aspire to anything less casts us on the inexorable and tragic path 
of “reject[ing] the best the earth could offer.”476 
In a “world . . . lit by lightning,” humanity seems determined to extinguish the 
biosphere’s sources of diversity, inspiration, and beauty as though there were mere 
“candles.”477 Perhaps we may find in evolutionary history and aesthetic “motion 
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what was lost in [legal] space,”478 the better to present “truth in the pleasant disguise 
of illusion.”479 In an ironic twist on the more familiar political struggles over the 
teaching of evolution and biological literacy in the United States, “evolution has pro-
duced sentient species with a sense of purpose”—the very beings equipped and in-
clined to explore “the connections that might serve to reunify the scientific world-
view with the religious instinct.”480 “[R]eligion and science,” as “the two most pow-
erful forces in the world today,” have a unique opportunity—and responsibility—to 
become “united on the common ground of biological conservation” and agree “that 
we owe ourselves and future generations a beautiful, rich, and healthful environ-
ment.”481 
Among creation myths vying to satisfy the human need for a compelling story of 
origins, especially in an emotionally challenging “age of globalization,” “none is 
more solid and unifying for the species than evolutionary history.”482 No other story 
of human beginnings boasts a more expansive narrative scope or enjoys greater sci-
entific support.483 “The Epic of Evolution . . . beautifully suited to anchor our search 
for planetary consensus,” promises to unite not merely all branches of humanity, but 
own species with the entire tapestry of life itself.484 
The tree of life, from a pivotal 1990 reorganization485 to more recent debates over 
the precise relationship among Archaea, bacteria, and eukaryotes,486 is now estimated 
to contain as many as a trillion (1012) microbial species.487 The horses of the 
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Anthropocene need not fulfill their calamitous destiny. Even the spiritual tradition 
that ends in the Apocalypse contemplates “a vision” of “red, brown, and white 
horses,” reporting “to the angel of the Lord . . . standing among the myrtle trees, ‘We 
have gone through the earth and found the whole world at rest and in peace.’”488 
Realigning environmental law with the scientific understanding of biodiversity 
loss produces its own epiphany, its own spiritually satisfying path toward detecting 
an “echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal 
law.”489 So that we might “explore and learn” all that the world would teach us, “all 
things [must] be mysterious and unexplorable, [and] land and sea [must] be infinitely 
wild, unsurveyed and unfathomed by us because unfathomable.”490 
The project of ameliorating humanity's environmental footprint demands humil-
ity, wonder, and above all a thorough understanding of humanity’s place in natural 
history. “[I]ntense spiritual feelings” arise from the “unfathomable complexity and 
. . . sublime beauty” of the biosphere at its fullest and most diverse.491 Only by re-
capturing the “beauty and mystery that seized us at the beginning” can the law hope 
to harness, perchance to halt, the horses of our ecological apocalypse.492 
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